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[T]he House that we have been building for many years has now
been…completed. On examination it would appear that it has been built
according to our specifications. It would also appear that it has many
rooms to accommodate all of us. The question that has to be asked is
whether this House will be able to withstand the heat of the Free State,
the floods of Natal, the biting winter weather of the Transvaal. Will it
withstand the Cape’s storms? I have no doubt that it will. I am very
optimistic. — Bulelani Ngcuka, 6 February 19971
The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) was inaugurated on 6 February 1997 as 
a second House or chamber of the Parliament of South Africa. With its launch it was 
hoped that the NCOP established by the final Constitution (‘the Constitution’)2 
would provide a stronger link between Parliament and the provinces than its 
predecessor, the Senate, which had existed under the Interim Constitution.3 The 
NCOP consistently emphasised in the Fourth Parliament that it was not prepared to 
be a mere ‘rubber stamp’ of legislation transmitted to it by the National Assembly 
(NA). The NCOP would therefore be expected to act as a house of review and 
carefully scrutinise s 75 bills passed by the first chamber, the NA. The political 
leadership of the NCOP of the Fifth Parliament that was established in July 2014, 
indicated that it would be ‘business unusual’ for the NCOP in its quest to improve 
its image and work. 
The NCOP was created to enhance the participation of provinces in the 
legislative processes of the national Parliament. In terms of s 42(4) of the 
Constitution, the NCOP ‘represents the provinces to ensure that provincial interests 
are taken into account in the national sphere of government. It does this mainly by 
participating in the national legislative process and by providing a national forum 
1 Debates of the National Council of Provinces (Hansard)  First Session — Second Parliament 
6 February to 21 November 1997 vol 13 col 10. Address by Bulelani Ngcuka on accepting his 
nomination as Deputy Chairperson of the NCOP on 6 February 1997.  
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983. 
6 
for public consideration of issues affecting the provinces’. The NCOP also plays a 
role in maintaining intergovernmental relations among the three spheres of 
government created in the Constitution, namely the local, provincial and national 
spheres. Having all three spheres of government represented in the same chamber 
allows it to address conflicts, as all three viewpoints must be considered in the 
legislative process.4   
In terms of s 44(1)(b) of the Constitution, the NCOP has the power to (i) 
‘participate in amending the Constitution in accordance with section 74’; (ii) ‘pass 
[s 76 bills dealing with provincial or concurrent competences]’ and ‘any other 
matter [allowed] by the Constitution…’ and (iii) consider s 75 legislation that has 
been ‘passed by the National Assembly’.  
The consideration and passing of legislation affecting provinces is possibly the 
NCOP’s most important role. Because of its mandate to represent provincial 
interests, the NCOP has more influence over bills affecting provinces, ie s 76 bills 
and those constitutional amendment bills in terms of s 74 that require the approval 
of the NCOP to be passed.5 The NCOP’s legislative powers in respect of bills 
affecting provinces are intended to ensure that the consideration of provincial 
interests in the national legislative processes of Parliament is given more than mere 
lip service. Whereas the NA can pass s 75 legislation not affecting provinces with or 
without the NCOP’s approval, it cannot do so in respect of bills affecting provinces. 
The NCOP’s legislative power in respect of s 76 bills is formidable enough to stop 
the passage of a s 74 or s 76 bill in some instances, if it is rejected by six provinces 
(in the case of a s 74 bill) or five provinces (in the case of a s 76 bill) of the nine 
provinces voting in the NCOP. This is because the mediation procedures the 
Constitution provides to resolve disagreements between the NA and the NCOP on 
such a bill, tips the scale in the NCOP’s favour if it was introduced in the NCOP.6 If 
4 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa The National Council of Provinces. Perspectives 
on the first ten years (2008) at 18.  
5 Not all constitutional amendments require the NCOP’s approval as I discuss la ter in the 
chapter. 
6 Mediation and the role of the Mediation Committee are discussed more fully in later chapters 
of the study. 
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the NA wants to pass a bill rejected by provinces, it can only do so with a two-thirds 
majority vote of NA members. 
The Constitution requires provincial voices to be heard. Each province has one 
vote in respect of ss 74 and 76 bills affecting provinces which require the support of 
six and five provinces, respectively, to be passed by the NCOP.  
To ensure that politicians in the NCOP that are based in Cape Town maintain 
their connections with the provinces they represent and do not make unilateral 
decisions on their behalf, the Constitution requires a provincial legislature to convey 
its decision on a bill or a question before the NCOP in the form of a mandate. It 
confers the mandate on its provincial delegation to authorise the delegation to act or 
make decisions on the province’s7 behalf in the NCOP. A mandate can be open and 
give wide discretion to the delegation or it can be specific, eg to negotiate within 
specified perimeters for a province’s position on or proposed amendments to be 
included in a bill8, or to vote (or abstain from voting) in favour of or against a bill or 
a question in the NCOP plenary.  
Mandates are required for s 76 bills and constitutional amendments in terms of 
s 74(1)(b), (2)(b), (3)(b) and (8). Section 65 of the Constitution required the 
enactment of legislation to provide a uniform procedure to govern the mandating 
process. The Mandating Procedures of Provinces Act 52 of 2008, (‘the MPPA’) 
gives effect to s 65. It regulates the manner in which the voices of provinces must be 
taken into account in especially the consideration of bills affecting provinces, and 
sets out a uniform mandating procedure in this regard. A provincial legislature 
committee can confer a negotiating ‘mandate’ on a special or permanent delegate to 
negotiate in the NCOP committee for amendments a province may want to propose 
in respect of a s 76 bill. When it comes to voting on a s 74 or s 76 bill, the mandate 
or authority to vote in the NCOP on the province’s behalf must be conferred on the 
7 The terms ‘province’ and ‘provincial legislature’ are used interchangeably in the study.  
8 In terms of current practice s 74 bills altering provincial boundaries cannot be amended — I 
discuss this situation in Chapter 5. 
8 
provincial delegation (as opposed to a single delegate) at a sitting of the provincial 
legislature. The head of the delegation (the Premier or other nominated person) casts 
the vote in the NCOP on the province’s behalf. 
Mandates are also required in respect of money bills in terms of the Money 
Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act 9 of 2009. However, this falls 
outside the scope of this study, the focus of which is the mandating processes 
concerning ss 74 and 76 bills. 
In terms of the MPPA and current practices in Parliament, obtaining 
provincial mandates comprises a multi-stage process. It requires co-ordination 
between the NCOP and provinces, and also that provinces must consult the public 
(usually through public hearings) on proposed legislation which must inform the 
initial position or views on a bill. Provincial legislatures authorise or mandate their 
provincial delegations to take the provincial legislature’s position (negotiating 
mandate, often accompanied by proposed amendments) to the NCOP select 
committee where they will negotiate with other provinces or provincial delegations 
on their positions or views and how the bill should be amended to accommodate 
those views. This is the testing ground to determine whether provinces (and not the 
NCOP per se) can accommodate the needs of other provinces. The NCOP provides 
a forum where provinces can communicate their positions informed by their unique 
challenges — evoked by Ngcuka’s reference to the ‘heat of the Free State, the 
‘floods of Natal’ and the ‘Cape’s storms’. The bill agreed to during negotiations is 
sent back to the provincial legislatures to indicate to the NCOP select committee in 
their final mandates whether or not they will support the bill in the NCOP plenary. 
The select committee records provinces’ final mandates — provinces do not actually 
vote on the bill in the select committee. Provinces next prepare voting mandates (the 
final step in the mandating process) which instruct the heads of the provincial 
delegations how to vote in the NCOP plenary. Up to this stage provinces still have 
an opportunity to change their mandates. After the NCOP passes a ss 74 or 76 bill 
with the requisite number of votes, it is transmitted to the NA for consideration of 
NCOP amendments (in reality provinces’ amendments).  
9 
Over the years the NCOP has been the subject of numerous internal and 
scholarly reviews and introspection to determine whether it has lived up to 
expectations and has fulfilled its mandate to represent the provinces in Parliament. 
This study focuses on the participation of provinces in the legislative processes. It 
confirms many of the challenges and shortcomings pointed out in past studies. 
Nowhere is this more evident or more important than in the passage of national 
legislation affecting provinces directly. The study examines past and current 
practices and also examines the political influence on NCOP decisions and 
processes flowing from the control of the majority party, the African National 
Congress (ANC), of both the NCOP and eight of the nine provinces. The case 
studies in Chapter 4 in particular are used to consider how practices or processes 
would need to change should the political landscape change in future. For example, 
if the margin between the ruling party and opposition parties in the NCOP were 
smaller, it would be more difficult to obtain a supporting vote of five or six 
provinces on bills affecting provinces in the NCOP, meaning that a longer 
negotiating period and thus a longer legislative cycle would be needed to 
accommodate the process for provinces to agree on the contents of bills affecting 
provinces.  
The study points out a number of stages in the mandating process that can 
possibly be strengthened, as well as a number of shortcomings that can be fixed. It 
explores provincial participation and examines (a) how and (b) to what extent 
negotiating mandates of the respective provinces are taken into account in the 
legislative processes of Parliament in selected ss 74 and 76 bills. The study also 
evaluates to what extent current systems, processes, rules and legislation give effect 
to the will of provinces, as an expression of the views emanating from provincial 
public participation. As public input only informs, and cannot prescribe (my 
emphasis), the provincial legislature’s position on a bill, the study discusses 
provincial participation in this context, and not public participation per se.  
In order to place the NCOP’s role in perspective, Chapter 2 provides a brief 
overview of the historic background and evolution of the Parliament of South 





2 touches on the Senate that was reintroduced in 1994 as the forerunner of the 
NCOP, and then gives an overview of the constitutional and legislative framework 
from which the NCOP derives its mandate. The Constitution created three 
distinctive, interdependent and interrelated spheres of government and the NCOP 
plays an important role in maintaining cooperative governance or intergovernmental 
relations (IGR). The NCOP’s role in IGR follows the German model, ‘emphasizing 
concurrency, provincial delivery of national policies, and provincial representation 
at the center’.9 Chapter 2 also briefly compares the mandating processes of the 
NCOP and the second chamber of the German Federal Republic, the Bundesrat.  
 
The subsequent chapters focus on selected aspects of the mandating process. 
Chapter 3 is a short chapter on the MPPA itself. It critically discusses the Act and its 
objectives, and how it fits into the constitutional role of the NCOP. The Chapter 
examines in which ways the Act helps or hinders the mandating processes, with 
reference to the processes followed in the Traditional Courts Bill 2012 (TCB 2012) 
and views gathered from various participants in the legislative process.10 It explains 
certain challenges and questions around mandating processes that emerged during 
the processing of the TCB 2012. Chapter 3 observes that the MPPA has not 
addressed the inherent challenges of the mandating process, including ensuring (a) 
adequate and meaningful public participation and (b) providing mechanisms to 
address an impasse during negotiations and ensure a clear outcome: an amended, 
unchanged or rejected bill. The discussion also highlights the internal conflicts that 
delegates face as legislators representing provinces, but also as members of political 
parties under strict discipline to adhere to instructions on their parties’ position(s) on 
particular bills.  
 
                                                 
9 Richard Simeon and Christina Murray ‘Multi-Sphere Governance in South Africa: An Interim 
Assessment’ (2001) 31 Publius at 65.  
10 Interviews were conducted with different role players representing the target groups 
including the executive (members of the provincial cabinet) and the legislature (presiding 
officers, ordinary Members and relevant staff of the NCOP and the provincial legislatures ), as 
well as national government officials involved in selected bills.  
11 
In terms of NCOP Rule 240,11 a six-week legislative period applies to the 
processing of s 76 bills in the NCOP which can be extended by the Chairperson of 
the NCOP. However, the Rules do not clearly define when this extension should 
end, and when the situation should be re-evaluated. The MPPA also does not 
contain any provisions that clarify whether such a bill is exempted from lapsing if it 
is not passed at the end of an annual session, and the Council (NCOP) does not 
revive it at the first sitting in the ensuing session. Chapter 3 concludes by 
recommending a review of the MPPA and the Rules of the NCOP with a view to 
amending them to (a) insert new provisions or rules or (b) amend existing ones to 
address the challenges identified.  
Chapter 4 examines the mandates required in respect of s 76 bills by way of 
case studies (in two different sectors involving two different NCOP committees), viz 
the 2007 and 2013 National Environmental Management (Coastal Management) 
Bills and the TCB 2012. The discussion on the TCB elaborates some of the issues 
raised in Chapter 3 regarding the challenges in the mandating process. However, 
more focus is given to the provincial public consultation requirement in s 118 of the 
Constitution. The Chapter considers whether a province’s or the NCOP’s public 
consultation can remedy a department’s flawed, failed or inadequate public 
engagement on proposed legislation, and whether or not such a bill should be 
referred back to the department for proper public consultation.  
The Coastal Management Bill was processed in 2007, before the enactment of 
the MPPA. The discussion of this bill considers the steps taken by the national 
department to consult with the electorate and relevant stakeholders. It illustrates the 
extent to which public consultation, which took place over a period of seven years, 
can and should be meaningful — it assisted in developing the policy which ensured 
stakeholder buy-in from the start. The bill was widely accepted and mandating 
processes ensured that the interests of especially the four coastal provinces were 
taken into consideration. The case study is an example of a s 76 bill that affects only 
11 Parliament of South Africa (2012) Rules of the National Council of Provinces 9 ed March 
2008. 
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certain provinces directly which raises interesting and important questions on the 
role of provinces in the mandating process if they are not directly affected by a bill: 
are they expected to hold public consultations, develop negotiating mandates and 
participate in negotiations, and how does this impact on the negotiating power of 
directly-affected provinces? The discussion looks at what steps affected provinces 
can take to assist their cause(s) to ensure they maximise and benefit from 
negotiations, and raise their concerns about unfunded mandates in a way that ensure 
other provinces support their positions on, or proposed amendments in respect of, 
such bills. 
Chapter 5 discusses the mandating procedures for s 74 bills (bills amending 
the Constitution). It refers to the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005 (‘the 
Twelfth Amendment’), and the Constitutional Court (CC) challenge to the Twelfth 
Amendment and parts of the Cross-boundary Municipalities Laws and Repeal 
Related Matters Act 23 of 2005 in Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (‘Merafong’).12 The legislation 
sought to eliminate cross-boundary municipalities and, consequently, alter 
provincial boundaries. In terms of s 74 of the Constitution, a province’s approval, in 
the form of a mandate, is required for constitutional amendment bills that seek to 
alter provincial boundaries. In Merafong the CC held that notwithstanding the 
importance of public consultation and public opinion in informing a provincial 
legislature’s mandate, the legislature can change its mandate under certain 
circumstances without reverting to the public. The discussion supports the CC’s 
views in this regard, but at the same time argues for a different approach, including 
informing the public about the legislature’s intention to change its mandate and the 
reasons for that decision. 
Chapter 5 also considers the question whether s 74(3) and (8) allow for 
amendments in the NCOP of a Constitutional Amendment Bill that alters provincial 
boundaries. The discussion explores pronouncements of the CC on this issue and 
argues that amendments are allowed. The Chapter concludes that this issue requires 
12 CCT 41/07 [2008] ZACC 10. 
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further refinement and clarification in legislation and the Rules of Parliament, and 
proposes various options for consideration.  
Chapter 6 concludes the study and summarises its findings regarding the 
extent to which the (a) NCOP gives effect to its constitutional mandate to represent 
provincial interests in national legislative processes and (b) provinces themselves 
enhance their participation in the passing of national legislation that affect them and 
decision-making in the NCOP. The NCOP processes fewer ss 74 and 76 bills that 
affect provinces directly compared to s 75 bills that do not affect provinces. For the 
most part the NCOP functions as a house of review of legislation transmitted by the 
NA in respect of most s 75 bills it processes. This underscores the NCOP’s 
determination not to simply ‘rubber stamp’ legislation passed by the NA.  
Chapter 6 summarises the challenges that emerged in mandating processes in 
practice — either due to specified gaps in the MPPA, NCOP Rules, the Joint Rules 
of Parliament and/or the Constitution, or because of a misinterpretation of their 
application. The Chapter lists the recommendations made in the study, including 
possible amendments to the MPPA, the Joint Rules of Parliament13and the NCOP 
Rules to bring about the desired change(s) to (a) enhance mandating procedures in 
the NCOP and (b) enable provinces to have a more meaningful impact on the 
legislative and other Parliamentary processes affecting provinces. 
13 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Joint Rules of Parliament (2011) 6 ed 29 June 
2011. Available at http://www.parliament.gov.za/content/JOINT%20RULES%20A5~1.pdf. 




The NCOP owes its life, in part, to the problems that besieged its predecessor, the 
Senate. At the time of its dissolution, the Senate had evolved from the Westminster 
model of an upper chamber representing the elite, to a second chamber representing 
the interests of provinces. As a ‘new institution’, the NCOP ‘did not have an exact 
replica in the Senate or any other second chamber. This uniqueness has posed 
challenges to persons who seek to definitely elaborate its exact nature and 
function’.14 The discussion of the historic background and the constitutional and 
legislative mandate of the NCOP in this Chapter provides some context to the 
NCOP. This is not an analytical chapter, but an account of the history of the NCOP 
and the way it works under the Constitution. Because the German second chamber, 
the Bundesrat, bears closest resemblance to the NCOP and influenced its design, I 
include a short description of mandating processes in the Bundesrat compared to the 
NCOP.  
2. Historic Background: The nature and evolution of the South African
Parliament
The evolution of the Senate, the forerunner to the NCOP, is intrinsically linked to 
the evolution of Parliament. The discussion starts in 1910 when South Africa 
became a Union. The Union’s founding Constitution formally established a bi-
cameral Parliament and the evolution of the Parliament, and particularly its Senate, 
can be linked to major political developments leading up to South Africa’s 
attainment of democracy in 1994.  
14 Naledi Pandor ‘Remarks by Minister of Science and Technology, Naledi Pandor, MP at the 
NCOP workshop for the 2014 Parliament, 1 July 2014’. Unpublished. Pandor was the 





2.1 Bi-cameral Parliament 1910 to 1982 
 
The Union of South Africa was established on 31 May 1910 even though South 
Africa only gained independence from its colonial ruler, Great Britain, in 1931 
through the Statute of Westminster. At the time of Union, the four colonies (Cape, 
Transvaal, Orange River and Natal) had their own administrations, courts, 
parliaments and treasuries15 which favoured their white population of predominantly 
British and Dutch descent over ‘non-whites’.  
 
The unification of the four colonies was first discussed at the Pretoria 
Conference that met in 1908 to discuss railway tariffs between the different 
colonies. Delegates resolved to hold a National Convention for the purpose of 
drafting a constitution for the Union. Although the argument for a Union was 
primarily racially motivated (‘the white population, if united under one government, 
[would be] strong enough to deal with any danger [posed by blacks]’16), it was 
acknowledged that separate administrations made the government ‘inefficient, 
cumbrous, and expensive’.17 The National Convention met in October 1908 until 
February 1909. The issue of voting rights for non-whites was a contentious one. In 
the Free State and Transvaal non-whites were not allowed to vote at all, whereas 
they had limited voting rights in the Cape and Natal. At the time, voting rights in the 
Cape and Natal colonies were ‘qualified by property and education requirements 
[and] the voters roll in the Cape…incorporated Africans and coloureds [which] by 
1910…represented 15% of the electorate’.18 In Natal only six Africans were eligible 
to vote, and only those Asians who had qualified to vote by 1893 could vote in 
national parliamentary elections. Asians who qualified after 1893 could participate 
in municipal and provincial elections. Despite opposition from the Free State and 
Transvaal, the Cape and Natal scored a minor victory in forging an agreement to not 
only retain the ‘non-white’ franchise in their colonies, but also to ensure their 
                                                 
15 RH Brand The Union of South Africa (1909) at 29. 
16 Brand op cit note 15 at 29.  
17 Brand ibid at 29. 
18 T Lodge ‘South Africa’ in Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa (2002) T Lodge, D 





protection in the Union Constitution. The voting rights of blacks and coloureds in 
the Cape and Natal colonies were entrenched in the Union Constitution by the 
requirement that coloured and black voters could only be removed from the voters 
roll with a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament sitting jointly.19 The 
Union’s Constitution, the South Africa Act of 1909, was later adopted by each 
colony’s Parliament after considerable amendments. A referendum was held in June 
1909 in which only whites participated and voted in favour of the Union and the 
adoption of the Union Constitution.  
 
The Union Constitution established a new Parliament that consisted of the 
Senate (upper chamber) comprising indirectly-elected members, and the House of 
Assembly (lower chamber) comprising directly-elected members.20 The former 
Cape and Natal colonies were predominantly British colonies: Natal had maintained 
‘British methods and ideals’21, while the Cape Colony alone had had a 
‘parliamentary tradition’.22 This may explain the British influence of bi-cameralism, 
parliamentary sovereignty and the executive’s accountability to Parliament23 in the 
Union Parliament. However, its supremacy was subject to limitations imposed by 
the Statute of Westminster which entrenched certain provisions in the Union 
Constitution, for example the voting rights of coloureds.24 Changes to these 
entrenched provisions could only be passed by a majority of the two Houses of 
Parliament sitting jointly.  
 
In addition, the composition of Parliament could not be tampered with for a 
specified period as both chambers were ‘for the first period of their 
existence…constituted on…a provincial basis’.25 This was a major concession made 
                                                 
19 Section 35 of the South Africa Act of 1909. 
20 T Rapoo ‘In poor voice: NCOP’s weakness flows from the Westminster system’ (2001) 22 
Centre for Policy Studies Policy Brief, available at http://www.cps.org.za/22.htm, accessed on 
11 October 2012. 
21 Brand ibid at 38. 
22 Brand ibid at 55. 
23 D Anckar ‘Westminster Lilliputs? Parliaments in former small British colonies’ (2007) 60 
(4) Parliamentary Affairs at 641.  
24 I discuss the attempts by the NP government to change the voting rights of coloureds in the 
1950s in more detail later in the Chapter. 
25 Brand ibid at 44. 
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‘to secure the acceptance of a constitution unitary in its nature although apparently 
federal in some of its aspects’.26 Considering South Africa’s turbulent political 
history that unfolded over the next decades until the Constitutional crisis in the 
1950s over the government’s attempts to tamper with the coloured vote, these 
entrenched constitutional safeguards provided the only remedy with which the 
Courts could uphold the voting rights of coloureds. 
Despite its name, the Union of South Africa was a ‘divided state’ because ‘the 
Constitution granted the white minority parliamentary democracy [but] subjugated 
the majority of black South Africans to autocratic administrative rule’27 or ‘tribal 
authority’.28 Parliament passed the Native Administration Act 38 of 1927, which 
allowed for the substitution, by proclamation, of individual black land ownership 
with ‘communal tenure’. Because voter eligibility in the Cape was based on the 
value of individual property ownership, this Act effectively meant that blacks would 
no longer be able to qualify as voters in the Cape.29 The validity of the Native 
Administration Act was challenged in court in 1929 as a veiled attempt by the 
Union government to interfere with the Cape franchise.30 The Appellate Division, 
however, upheld the validity of this Act on the grounds that ‘interference with 
property rights [could] not be construed as an alteration of the qualification of 
voters’.31 A few years later, in 1936, Parliament passed the Representation of 
Natives Act 12 of 1936, with a two-thirds majority of both houses of Parliament 
sitting jointly as required by s 35(1) of the South Africa Act of 1909. The 
Representation of Natives Act removed blacks in the Cape from the common voters 
roll and placed them on a separate voters roll.32 
26 Brand ibid at 63. 
27 I Currie and J de Waal (contributing eds) ‘A constitutional history of South Africa’ (2001) P 
De Vos, Govender, K & Klug, H (contributors) The new Constitutional and Administrative 
Law Volume 1: Constitutional Law at 51. 
28 Currie and Waal op cit note 27 at 52. 
29 Currie and Waal ibid at 53. 
30 R v Ndobe 1930 AD 484.   
31 R v Ndobe supra at 496. 
32 Currie and Waal ibid at 54. Blacks in the Cape could only elect three white representatives’ 
to represent them in the Assembly, and elect (through a system of indirect representation) four 





The Union government next set its sights on the entrenched Cape coloured 
vote. According to s 35(1) of the South Africa Act, an amendment to change the 
voting rights of coloureds in the Cape could only be passed by a two-thirds majority 
of both houses of Parliament sitting jointly.33 This clause presented a challenge for 
the National Party (NP) that came into power in 1948 as it did not hold a two-thirds 
majority in Parliament. The NP’s attempts during the 1950s to bypass the 
requirements of s 35 in order to pass the Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 
of 1951, which removed coloureds from the ordinary voters roll to a separate voters 
roll, plunged South Africa into a constitutional crisis.34 The Appellate Division 
struck down this Act as it had been passed with an ordinary majority and not a two-
thirds majority, rejecting the argument that it previously followed in Ndlwana v 
Hofmeyr35 that the Statute of Westminster had impliedly repealed the entrenched 
clauses in the South Africa Act36 and that the Union Parliament could therefore 
enact laws as it saw fit.37 The Court held that while the Union Parliament was 
undeniably supreme, it was bound by the relevant provisions of the South Africa 
Act of 1909, and that the ‘Court is competent to enquire whether, regard being had 
to the provisions of sec. 35, an Act of Parliament has been validly passed’.38  
 
The NP retaliated by establishing Parliament as a High Court. In terms of the 
High Court of Parliament Act 35 of 1952, the two houses of Parliament sitting 
jointly could overrule the Appellate Division if it invalidated Acts of Parliament. 
But, the Appellate Division struck down this Act in 1952.39 The NP next inflated the 
size of the Senate in 195540 by passing the Senate Act 53 of 1955, which increased 
the number of NP-nominated Senators41 to ensure it would obtain a two-thirds 
                                                 
33 Christopher Forsyth In Danger for their talents: A study of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of South Africa from 1950 ̶ 80  (1985) at 70.  
34 The NP government recognised four main race groups and afforded each group different 
rights and privileges according to their hierarchy status. In order of most privileged to the least 
recognised were first ‘whites’ or ‘Europeans’ who were born in South Africa but deemed to be 
of European descent. Next were the non–white groups, namely ‘coloureds’ who were regarded 
as mixed race, followed by Indians (those of Indian descent), and last were ‘blacks’, 
previously also referred to in legislation as ‘natives’.  
35 Ndlwana v Hofmeyr NO 1937 AD 229. 
36 Sections 35 and 152 of the Union of South Africa Act of 1909.  
37 Harris and others v Minister of the Interior and another 1952 (2) SA 428 (A). 
38 Harris supra p55 at para D. 
39 Minister of the Interior and another v Harris and others  1952 (4) SA 769 (A). 
40 Forsyth op cit note 33. 
41 The Senate Act 53 of 1955, increased the number of Senators.  
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majority in a joint sitting of Parliament. It also increased the number of Appellate 
judges with predominantly NP supporters42 through a process known as ‘court-
packing’.43 This paved the way for Parliament to pass the South Africa Act 
Amendment Act 9 of 1956, in terms of which the voting rights of coloureds could 
be altered by a simple majority.44 Subsequently, in 1957, the Separate 
Representation of Voters Act 46 of 1951, which had been struck down by the 
Appellate Division in 1952, was revived and passed by Parliament with an ordinary 
majority. When the validity of this Act was again challenged in Collins v Minister of 
Interior45 the ‘NP-packed’46 Appellate Division upheld it.47   
The executive’s interference in the 1950s with the Senate’s powers, function and 
composition tarnished the Senate’s image beyond repair. As a second chamber it 
had become ineffective and meaningless, and therefore dispensable. It reviewed 
legislation passed by the first chamber as a mere formality and existed to ensure 
government had a sufficient majority to pass racially unjust laws. This state of 
affairs continued when South Africa became a Republic in 1961,48 as it retained the 
bi-cameral Parliament. It was only in 1980 that the NP government under P W 
Botha abolished the Senate through the Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth 
42 The Appellate Division Quorum Act 27 of 1955, increased the number of Appellate judges 
from six to eleven and required a quorum of eleven judges to adjudicate on the validity of Acts 
of Parliament. According to B Beinard ‘The South African Appeal Court and Judicial Review’ 
(1958) 21(6) MLR at 600, the government wanted ‘legal certainty’ about Parliament’s powers 
due to the divergence between Ndlwana v Hofmeyr and the coloured vote case. It believed that 
only a larger court than the one that adjudicated such matters in the past could do so.  
43 Enrique Petracchi To defer or to defy: judicial control in insecure environments 
(unpublished dissertation, Vanderbilt, nd) available at 
http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-12072007-
145535/unrestricted/DISSERTMANACSAPART2.pdf, accessed on 16 September 2015. The 
executive can influence the decisions of the courts by ‘replacing recalcitrant judges with more 
reliable agents. They can also increase the size of the court and then name loyalists to the 
judiciary’ at 259. 
44 BJ Liebenberg ‘The National Party in power’ (1986) in CFJ Muller (ed) Five Hundred Years 
A history of South Africa 5 ed 480–481.  
45 1957 (1) SA 552 (A). Ten of the eleven judges of the court (only Schreiner J dissented) held 
that the Act had been passed in accordance with the procedural requirement of the 1909 
Constitution. 
46 Forsyth ibid.  
47 The judiciary and the courts were heavily criticised for their role in upholding unjust laws 
and their complicity with the NP government. Forsyth supra comments eg that the judiciary 
could have opposed the validity of unjust laws on the basis of the common law and the 
Westminster principle of Parliamentary sovereignty on the grounds of fairness.  
48 A referendum was held in 1960 in which the majority voted  in support of South Africa 
becoming a Republic. This was done through the enactment of the Republic of South Africa 





Amendment Act 110 of 1980. Section 24 of this Act provided for Parliament to 
consist of the State President and the House of Assembly, while s 102 established a 
President’s Council (PC), an advisory body with no legislative powers. 
 
2.2 Tri-cameral Parliament 1983 to 1993 
 
In 1980 a parliamentary select committee considered constitutional reforms 
recommended by the Theron Commission that was appointed in 1977 to improve 
the situation of coloureds.49 The Theron Commission had advocated for the 
abolition of the Westminster system, whereupon the select committee recommended 
the creation of a tri-cameral parliament to include limited representation of 
coloureds and Indians, but still exclude blacks. Blacks were not allowed to 
participate in elections or to be represented in Parliament. The Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983, created three ‘lower’ houses of Parliament 
with equal powers, respectively representing whites, coloureds and Indians. The 
largest chamber, the House of Assembly, represented whites and consisted of 185 
white members. The House of Representatives represented coloured voters and 
consisted of 85 representatives. The House of Delegates was the smallest chamber 
and consisted of 45 Indian delegates representing Indians. Despite wide opposition 
by the anti-tri-cameral Parliament campaign, the majority of whites voted in favour 
of the constitutional reforms and the establishment of a tri-cameral Parliament in a 
Referendum on 2 November 1983. The tri-cameral Parliament was subsequently 
inaugurated in 1985. In terms of s 6(4) of the 1983 Constitution, the State President 
became the head of state with the same powers and functions that he had as Prime 
Minister ‘immediately before the commencement of this Act…by way of 
prerogative’. Cabinet members were drawn from all three houses of the tri-cameral 
Parliament, while PC members would be elected proportionally by the three 
houses.50  
 
                                                 
49 South African History Online ‘Tricameral Parliament’ available at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/tricameral-parliament, accessed on 11 May 2015. 
50 South African History Online (2015) op cit note 49. 
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These constitutional reforms made the executive State President more powerful and 
weakened Parliament. Coloured and Indian representation in the tri-cameral 
Parliament was ‘largely cosmetic, as real political power would remain concentrated 
in the House of Assembly, and, by extension, in the hands of the [w]hite minority’.51 
As the PC was only an advisory body to the President, the President was not bound 
by its recommendations. Furthermore, South Africa’s policy of racial segregation 
and the exclusion of blacks from the PC endowed its constitutional 
recommendations with ‘no more value than oxygen administered to a corpse’.52  
2.3. Reintroduction of the Senate in 1994 
The 1980s were marked by increasing popular resistance among black South 
Africans to the oppressive, undemocratic NP government under PW Botha. The 
latter retaliated by violently dispersing peaceful protests, killing and arresting 
liberation movement leaders with the use of the army and the police force. The ANC 
embarked on an armed struggle to ‘make apartheid unworkable and [the] country 
ungovernable’.53 This, and the growing international condemnation of the apartheid 
state, forced the NP government to enter into negotiations with the liberation 
movement for a peaceful settlement. This started with inter alia the release of 
certain political prisoners by the new NP president FW de Klerk in 1989, followed 
by the release of former President Nelson Mandela in 1990. The 1990s thus ushered 
in a period of ‘transition and negotiation’.54 The ruling NP and the African National 
Congress (ANC) were the main negotiators during protracted negotiations for a 
democratic dispensation in South Africa. South Africa’s first democratic elections 
were held in 1994, four years after Mandela’s release. 
51 South African History Online (2015) ibid. 
52 Republic of South Africa Hansard (1981) President’s Council 1st session 6 February 1981 
col 39–49 Inaugural address by P T Poovalingam on 6 February 1981.  
53 L Segal and S Cort One Law, One Nation. The making of the South African Constitution  
(2011) at 42. 
54 South African History Online ‘Transition and negotiation, 1990–1994’ available at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/transition-and-negotiation-1990-1994, accessed on 31 July 2015. 
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An Interim Constitution (IC), the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 200 of 1993, was adopted in 1993 and came into force on 27 April 1994, the 
day of the 1994 elections.55 The IC established new provinces,56 increasing the 
number of provinces from four to nine.  
The IC also reintroduced the Senate as a second chamber of Parliament. According 
to Mandela who became the first President of the democratic South Africa, the 
reintroduced Senate had two broad objectives. It had to (a) represent provincial 
interests in the national Parliament and (b) facilitate co-operative governance by (i) 
‘embody[ing] the unity of South Africa and its people’, (ii) giving expression to the 
‘interdependence of provinces’, (iii) playing a role in the Constitution-making 
process, (iv) initiating national legislation and (v) playing a ‘crucial role in the 
composition of the judicial bodies in general and the CC in particular’.57 Senators 
were not accountable to provincial legislatures and the IC did not clearly define the 
Senate’s liaison with the provinces.58 This contributed to the Senate being criticised 
for inadequately representing provincial interests, not providing a link or 
communication with provinces, and duplicating the work of the Assembly.59 Parties 
consequently agreed to replace the Senate, but it was only after further protracted 
negotiations and a multi-party visit to Germany in 1995, that its replacement was 
defined in the final Constitution concluded in 1996.60  
55 The ANC and NP were also the main negotiators for the drafting of a final Constitution 
which was adopted in 1996. 
56 Section 124(1) establishment the provinces as follows: (a) Eastern Cape; (b) Eastern 
Transvaal; (c) Natal (the name later changed to KwaZulu/Natal in terms of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 2 of 1994); (d) Northern Cape; (e) Northern 
Transvaal; (f) North West; (g) Orange Free State; (h) Pretoria -Witwatersrand-Vereeniging; and 
(i) Western Cape.
57 Senate Hansard 1994: 1012 N R Mandela Debate on the President’s Budget Vote in the
Senate 14 September 1994 cited in M L Brandt From the Senate to the NCOP: A description of
the Composition and Working of South Africa’s Second Chamber (unpublished Masters of
Philosophy in Political Management thesis University of Stellenbosch 2001) at 7.
58 The National Council of Provinces Perspectives on the first ten years op cit note 4 at 11.
59 The National Council of Provinces Perspectives on the first ten years  ibid at 18.
60 Ibid.
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2.4 Inception of the NCOP as a second chamber in 1997 
Section 42 of the Constitution establishes the NCOP as Parliament’s second 
chamber. The launch of the NCOP in 1997 embodied an agreement providing for 
direct representation of provincial interests at the national legislative level.61 
Compared to the Senate, the NCOP is no chip off the old block. Its design is based 
on the Bundesrat of the Federal Republic of Germany, albeit with distinct 
differences. The South African constitution-drafters, in exploring different options 
for a new second chamber for a democratic South Africa post 1994, found the 
German system of federalism to be the most suitable for South Africa’s proposed 
regions or provinces.62 In Germany most powers are concurrent, and on many 
matters the individual länder execute laws adopted at the federal level and the 
länder participate directly in the federal government through the Bundesrat, the 
German second chamber.63 The Bundesrat resembles closely what South Africa 
envisaged for its second chamber — a national council representing regional or 
provincial interests — thus, the National Council of Provinces. What appealed to 
South Africa was Germany’s ‘division of power between arms and spheres of 
government [wherein] the Federation (or national government) and the Länder 
(comparable with South Africa’s provinces) should work within a mutual checks-
and-balances system but also practice mutual co-operation and consideration’.64 
Because South Africa adopted a system of semi-autonomous provinces and ‘a strong 
emphasis on the need for co-operation between the various spheres of government’, 
the NCOP, like the Bundesrat, was designed as ‘an institutional arrangement which 
promoted co-operation rather than competition between national and sub-national 
61 According to Murray (1998) quoted in Brandt op cit note 57, the establishment of provinces 
and a system of co-operative governance was agreed on to accommodate parties that wanted a 
federal system of government. This illustrates the idea of a national government or unitary 
state with federal tendencies because provinces enjoy a limited amount of autonomy.  
62 Prior to 1994 South Africa followed a system of government with centralised power. By 
contrast, in a federal government system like Germany, power is distributed more evenly 
among autonomous federal states (regions or länder) and is not centralised in a national 
government.  
63 Konrad Reuter The Bundesrat and the federal state system. The Federal Council of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (2009) 14 ed at 52. 





government’.65 NCOP members are politicians nominated by provincial legislatures, 
which strengthens the link between the NCOP and provinces.  
 
Below is a brief overview of the mandate of the NCOP, its membership, legislative 
and veto powers, voting in the NCOP and its role in co-operative governance or 
intergovernmental relations (IGR).  
 
3. Overview of the NCOP 
 
3.1 Mandate  
 
The NCOP is the forum through which the provinces participate in legislation and 
other decisions of the national government. The NCOP must, in terms of s 42(4) of 
the Constitution, ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the 
national sphere of government. It gives effect to this mandate by participating in the 
national legislative process and providing a national forum for public consideration 
of issues affecting provinces. The NCOP’s constitutional mandate, in simple terms, 
is to (a) represent provincial interests in the national sphere of government 
(including in the passage of legislation);66 (b) participate in amending the 
Constitution;67 (c) approve and oversee (i) provincial intervention in municipalities68 
and (ii) national intervention in provinces;69 and (d) mediate between the local, 
provincial and national spheres of government.70 The Constitution also allows a 
delegation from organised local government to participate in the NCOP but not to 
vote. The NCOP was designed to have close links with the provinces (the equivalent 
of the länder in Germany) and its representation of provincial interests emulates the 
German model. The extent to which it does so is explored in later chapters in the 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Section 42 of the Constitution. 
67 S 74. 
68 S 139. 
69 S 100. 
70 Chapter 3. 
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study. The NCOP’s role as mediator in IGR to prevent conflict between the different 
spheres of government is also taken from the German model.  
3.1.1 Co-operative Government 
The NCOP’s role in IGR has been described as the ‘glue that holds the nation 
together’.71 This is an exaggeration because it implies poor cooperation or worse, a 
continuous state of conflict, between the different spheres of government and credits 
the NCOP with ensuring that they work together in harmony. Nonetheless, the 
NCOP has an important mediation role in IGR that helps it to ease conflict between 
the different spheres of government which is taken from the German model. The 
NCOP is the forum through which provinces participate directly in the national 
legislative process. It also, to some extent, allows for local government’s views to 
be represented although local government cannot vote on decisions in the NCOP. 
The NCOP thus has close links with both provinces and local government. Through 
the NCOP’s oversight role, provinces are able to hold national government 
accountable. At the same time the NCOP must ensure that provinces and local 
government implement national laws. Through its powers in respect of interventions 
by (a) national government in the administration of a province in terms of s 100 or 
(b) provincial government in that of a local government in terms of s 139 of the
Constitution, the NCOP is able to play a mediation role to prevent conflict and
foster co-operation between the different spheres of government.
The South African Constitution mirrors the German Basic Law’s division of 
power among the different spheres of government and the system of co-operative 
governance. Section 40(1) states that the ‘government is constituted as national, 
provincial and local spheres of government that are distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated’. The reference to ‘sphere’ as opposed to ‘level’ of government 
indicates that all three spheres are equal.72 Each sphere must respect each other’s 
71 The National Council of Provinces. Perspectives on the first ten years  ibid at 19. 
72 Christina Murray ‘NCOP: Stepchild of the Bundesrat’ (1999) 50 Jahre Herrenchiemseer 






autonomy. Any encroachment by another sphere is strictly governed by the 
Constitution, with the NCOP acting as watchdog in this regard. Section 41 sets out 
the ‘rules of engagement’ governing the relationship between each sphere and all 
organs of state with an emphasis on, inter alia, mutual respect for each sphere’s 
autonomy, co-operation and the peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to 
legal action.73  
 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution consists of only two sections, namely ss 40 and 
41. Chapter 3 makes no reference to the NCOP, nor does it expressly assign to it a 
role in co-operative government. Nevertheless, the NCOP’s role in IGR is 
embedded in its role assigned by s 42(4), particularly its representation of provincial 
interests and role in the national legislative process, described earlier.  
 
The composition of the NCOP’s delegation of provincial politicians and provincial 
executives (in addition to the participation of local government in the NCOP) 
underscores its central role in IGR. The NCOP’s representation of ‘the provincial 
perspective within the national Parliament’, embodies or gives ‘concrete expression 
of the commitment to co-operative government’.74 This follows the German model, 
‘emphasizing concurrency, provincial delivery of national policies, and provincial 
representation at the center’.75 Former NCOP Chairperson, Naledi Pandor, ascribes 
the relatively few inter-governmental conflicts in South Africa to the fact that the 
NCOP allows all spheres of government to express their views.76 While she may 
exaggerate, the NCOP does play a role in ensuring co-operation and communication 
between the different spheres of government.  
 
  
                                                 
73 Chapter 3 of the Constitution emphasises co–operation, consultation and co–ordination.  
74 Murray op cit note 72. 
75 Pandor (2014) ibid quoting Simeon and Murray op cit note 9.  
76 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa ibid at 21. 
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3.2 Membership and provincial representation 
The NCOP consists of 90 members and its membership is based on proportional 
representation. According to s 60 of the Constitution, each of the nine provinces is 
represented in the NCOP by a 10-member delegation appointed by the provincial 
legislatures. Each delegation comprises four special delegates (headed by the 
Premier of the province)77 and six permanent delegates appointed in terms of s 61(2) 
of the Constitution. The NCOP’s delegation thus consists of both provincial 
politicians (permanent and special delegates who are members of the legislatures) 
and executives who are members of the provincial cabinet (MECs). 
The NCOP is a forum through which provinces participate in the national 
legislative processes of Parliament. Over the years a practice has developed for 
permanent delegates to be nominated by provincial legislatures. Permanent 
delegates must thus be eligible to be members of the provincial legislature.  
Whereas special delegates retain their seats in the provincial legislature, a 
member of a provincial legislature appointed as a permanent delegate to the NCOP 
loses his or her seat in the provincial legislature. Section 62(3) of the Constitution 
states that: 
Permanent delegates are appointed for a term that expires…immediately before 
the first sitting of a provincial legislature after its next election; or…on the day 
before the appointment of permanent delegates in accordance with section 
61(2)(b)(ii) [ie party nominations] takes effect.  
Although they no longer hold seats in the provincial legislatures, permanent 
delegates are usually the ones who brief their respective provinces on s 74 and s 76 
bills. They also attend the first official sitting of the provincial legislature at the start 





of the parliamentary session. In this way NCOP members maintain links with their 
provinces. 
 
3.3 Legislative powers  
 
Provincial legislative authority is vested in provincial legislatures.78 As semi-
autonomous units, provinces can legislate on matters in which they have concurrent 
and exclusive legislative competence. In exercising its legislative powers a 
provincial legislature may ‘consider, pass, amend or reject’ legislation (including 
provincial constitutions) on matters within functional areas listed in schedules 4 and 
5 of the Constitution and matters ‘expressly assigned to the province by national 
legislation’.79 It can also ‘initiate or prepare legislation, except money bills’.80 
Concurrent legislative power in South Africa means that provincial and national 
legislation on the same matter can co-exist. However, s 146 of the Constitution 
provides that national legislation takes precedence over provincial legislation if it is,  
 
aimed at preventing unreasonable action by a province that…is prejudicial to 
the economic, health or security interests of another province or the country 
as a whole; or…impedes the implementation of national economic policy.  
 
National legislative authority is vested in Parliament by virtue of s 43 of the 
Constitution. In particular the NCOP has the power in terms of s 44(1)(b) of the 
Constitution,  
 
(i) to participate in amending the Constitution in accordance with section 74;  
(ii) to pass, in accordance with section 76, legislation with regard to any matter 
within a functional area listed in Schedule 4 and any matter required by the 
Constitution to be passed in accordance with section 76; and  
(iii) to consider, in accordance with section 75, any other legislation passed by 
the National Assembly.  
 
                                                 
78 Ss 43(b) and 104. 
79 S 104. 
80 S 114(1). 
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The Constitution distinguishes between three types of bills that the NCOP 
must consider and which affect provinces in varying degrees. Section 75 bills are 
‘ordinary’ bills that do not amend the Constitution and do not affect provinces.81 
The NCOP has limited influence over these bills and can only make non-binding 
suggestions to the NA about possible amendments to such bills. It is therefore 
logical for s 75 bills to be introduced in the NA because it can override amendments 
proposed by the NCOP. The latter typically only reviews s 75 bills transmitted by 
the NA. Nonetheless, the Fourth Parliament has listed legislation, including the 
Protection of State Information Bill of 2012 (one of the case studies in Chapter 4), 
in which the NA accepted amendments proposed by the NCOP.  
Under s 74 bills amending the Constitution require the affirmative vote of six 
provinces in order to be passed by the NCOP. Not all constitutional amendment bills 
require the NCOP’s approval, however. Bills that (a) amend s 1 and s 74(1) of the 
Constitution or (b) do not affect provinces (ie the amendment does not relate to a 
matter that affects the NCOP, change provincial boundaries, powers, functions or 
institutions or amend a provision that deals specifically with a provincial matter), do 
not require NCOP approval to be passed.  
Constitutional amendments like the alteration of provincial boundaries require 
the approval of affected provinces. In terms of s 74(8) such a province must approve 
the proposed amendment in order for the NCOP (and thus Parliament) to pass such a 
provision.82 Should an affected province withhold approval, it vetoes such 
amendment (and not the whole bill) from being passed. Although a province’s veto 
power is insufficient to stop a constitutional amendment bill from being passed by 
the NCOP if the majority of provinces vote in favour thereof, the affected province 
can stop the proposed provincial boundary change from being passed if it objects to 
such boundary change. 
81 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa National Assembly Guide to Procedure (2004) at 
173. 
82 Ss 74(3) and 74(8). 
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The NCOP has more influence over s 76 bills that affect provinces and 
constitutional amendments in terms of s 74 of the Constitution, than over ordinary 
legislation in terms of s 75. Because certain s 74 and s 76 bills affect provinces 
directly, the Constitution gives provincial legislatures a say in their adoption 
through the system of provincial mandates. Under s 65 of the Constitution provinces 
must vote on certain questions before the NCOP. Questions include bills. A 
province will thus confer a mandate or authority on their provincial delegations 
which tells them how to vote on the province’s behalf. Each province has one vote 
which is cast by the head of the provincial delegation in the NCOP. Delegates do 
not vote as individuals on s 76 and s 74 bills. As noted in Chapter 1, voting in the 
NCOP is preceded by an elaborate mandating process during which the provinces 
conduct public consultation, develop negotiating mandates for amendments they 
wish to include in s 76 bills, followed by final and voting mandates to instruct the 
head of the delegation how to vote in the Council — all within a strictly defined 
timeframe in a six-week period in terms of NCOP Rule 240.83  
Typically the six-week legislative cycle is divided as follows: In week one the 
national department responsible for the bill briefs the permanent delegates in the 
NCOP select committee. The NCOP then refers the bill to the provincial 
legislatures. In week two provincial legislatures prepare for public hearings on the 
bill which are held in week three. Following public hearings, provincial legislatures 
prepare their negotiating mandates in week three. The select committee schedules a 
negotiating meeting with provincial delegations in week four to discuss the 
negotiating mandates of the provinces and the amended or unchanged bill flowing 
from this process is returned to the provinces. Provincial legislatures prepare final 
mandates in week five. The select committee next considers final mandates before 
the NCOP plenary scheduled for week six.  
83 Rules of the National Council of Provinces op cit note 11. Under certain circumstances the 
Chairperson of the NCOP can extend the legislative period when requested by the chairperson 
of a select committee dealing with a s 76 bill. It is very rare for NCOP Committee s to request 





3.4 Voting  
 
As noted above, voting in the NCOP depends on the type of legislation or decision 
before it. Voting in respect of s 75 bills is by the individual delegate representing his 
or her party. The outcome of the process is determined by the numerical strength of 
the majority party in the NCOP. In respect of s 74 and s 76 bills, votes are cast on 
behalf of provinces. Each province has one vote and questions before the NCOP are 
agreed to when at least five out of nine provinces vote in favour of the question, or 




Sometimes the NA and the NCOP cannot agree on a bill. Because the NA’s override 
over s 76 bills that were introduced in the NA can only come into effect after 
mediation if there is still no agreement on the bill and if two-thirds of NA members 
vote in favour of such a bill, the NA must consider the NCOP’s proposed 
amendments of such bills. The Constitution provides for a Mediation Committee as 
a mechanism to end an impasse on a s 76 bill. The two houses are required to submit 
the bill to mediation in an attempt to reach consensus on which version of a bill to 
pass, if necessary a new version.  
 
A Mediation Committee, in terms of s 78, consists of 18 members, half from 
each chamber. NA members are proportionally represented in terms of their parties’ 
numerical strength in the NA, while the NCOP is represented by ‘one delegate from 
each provincial delegation…designated by the delegation’. Section 78(2) provides 
that the Mediation Committee ‘agree[s] on a version of a Bill, or decide[s] a 
question, when that version, or one side of the question, is supported by — (a) at 
least five of the representatives of the [NA]; and (b) at least five of the 
representatives of the [NCOP]’.  
                                                 
84 Section 65(1) of the Constitution deals with decisions of the Council. 
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Mediation can be described as ‘negotiation’85 and is intended to assist the two 
chambers to come to an agreement over the disputed bill. The Constitution does not 
define the term mediation, nor does it describe the process of mediation, but lists the 
different options available to the respective chambers. The Mediation Committee 
must attempt to resolve the impasse within 30 days of the bill’s referral to it. Should 
the Mediation Committee not reach agreement within the prescribed 30 days, the 
bill lapses in terms of s 78(2)(e) if it was introduced in the NCOP. If the bill was 
introduced in the NA, the NA has an override and can pass its own version of the 
bill with a vote of two-thirds of its members.86 Because provinces are unlikely to 
agree to the NA version and vice versa, the Mediation Committee will probably 
agree on a new version of the bill.87 If it does not, the bill lapses if it was introduced 
in the NCOP. This outcome seems the most unlikely of all in respect of a bill that 
has the support of provinces provided it is amended according to their wishes. It is 
unlikely that the NCOP would revive the same bill as it would simply end up in the 
Mediation Committee again on the same issue(s). Should the bill not be revived and 
the executive reintroduces the bill in Parliament without the changes provinces 
wanted, provinces will most likely reject the bill again and the NCOP will not be 
able to pass the bill. 
4. Comparative overview of the German Bundesrat and the NCOP
Resonating strongly in both the NCOP and the Bundesrat’s mandates is their 
representation of, and link with, the provinces (or regions in the case of the 
Bundesrat) which is intended to bring the NCOP/national legislature closer to the 
people and make it more responsive. Nonetheless, despite the Bundesrat being the 
85 Merriam Webster Dictionary ‘mediation’ available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/mediation , accessed on 3 June 2014. 
86 The Fourth Parliament referred few bills to mediation compared to the number of bills 
processed annually during its term. Interestingly, the Constitution provides for the NA, a nd not 
the NCOP, to have an override in respect of certain s76 bills affecting provinces. I consider 
this and whether provinces should have a veto power in respect of such bills, in Chapter 2.  
87 The outcome of mediation processes followed in respect of the Mandating Procedures of 
Provinces Bill [B8D–2007] was that the National Assembly passed a new or mediated version 





NCOP’s closest relative, the NCOP’s deviation from it in certain respects has earned 
it the title of ‘stepchild of the Bundesrat’.88  
 
One of the main differences between the NCOP and the Bundesrat lies in their 
membership. Bundesrat members are länd government officials acting on political 
instructions from the länd executives, whereas NCOP members are mainly 
politicians nominated by the provincial legislatures and who are required to act in 
terms of a decision of the provincial legislature on the most important matters before 
them. The NCOP’s representation of the provinces compares favourably with länder 
representation in the Bundesrat. Both chambers play significant roles in IGR to 
ensure respect for the autonomy of the various spheres of government in their 
interaction with each other. The scrutiny of legislation is possibly the main function 
of the second chambers.89 Whereas both chambers have significant influence over 
legislation that affects the regions directly, the Bundesrat’s strength and status is 
most evident in the veto power it has over certain types of legislation. In contrast, 
the NCOP does not have a veto over any legislation. It may block certain 
constitutional amendments and individual affected provinces (and not the NCOP 
itself) have a veto power over constitutional amendments that propose changes to 
their boundaries and other matters to which they object. Concerning those 
constitutional amendments in which provinces have a veto and interventions in 
terms of ss 100 and 139 of the Constitution in which the NCOP has an absolute 
veto, the NCOP’s power vis à viz the executive is significant. In particular, in 
respect of bills affecting provinces, it is very unlikely that the NA will pass a bill 
that provinces do not support. 
 
Below I briefly compare selected aspects of the länder and provincial participation 
in mandating procedures in respect of legislation and decisions in the Bundesrat and 
the NCOP.  
 
  
                                                 
88 Murray (1999) ibid. 
89 Meg Russell Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas (2000) at 120. 
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4.1 Mandating and decision-making 
(a) Ordinary bills affecting länder and provinces
The key difference between the NCOP and the Bundesrat is that regional 
participation in the NCOP is legislature-driven due to the participation of provincial 
legislatures, whereas in the Bundesrat it is executive-driven as its members are 
representatives of länd executives who are predominantly bureaucrats.  
Mandating processes in the NCOP are designed to ensure that provinces 
participate in decision-making on national legislation and matters that affect them 
directly, and in constitutional amendments that seek to change their provincial 
boundaries or competences assigned to provinces by the Constitution. The 
provincial legislature conveys its decision to other provinces in the NCOP in a 
negotiating mandate conferred on its provincial delegation. This allows provinces to 
first negotiate around issues raised in their respective mandates (informed by public 
input obtained) and if possible, agree on eg the amendments to be made on a s 76 
bill before a final decision is made. The outcome of the negotiations are referred 
back to the provincial legislatures for a final decision or voting mandate which the 
province will cast in the NCOP plenary. In this context the politicians in the 
provincial legislature makes decisions on behalf of the provincial executives and 
negotiations are essentially between provincial politicians.  
The German Bundesrat, on the other hand, is mainly composed of länd 
executives (not politicians) which means they input directly on matters and bills that 
affect länder. Bundesrat members are government officials acting on political 
instructions, whereas NCOP members are politicians nominated by the provincial 
legislatures. The Bundesrat, like the NCOP, has more influence over legislation and 
issues that affect the länder. The länder have a say in all federal legislation and with 
an absolute majority of their votes they can veto those laws which affect länder 





absolute veto over federal consent bills90 as they cannot be passed without its 
approval.91 The NCOP, similarly, has more influence over s 76 bills that affect 
provinces (the South African equivalent of consent bills) and constitutional 
amendments in terms of s 74 of the Constitution than over other bills, but the NA 
(first chamber) can override the NCOP on all bills other than constitutional 
amendments. Affected provinces (not the NCOP itself) have a limited veto in 
respect of constitutional amendment bills that propose changes to their provincial 
boundaries and certain other matters. The NCOP does, however, have an absolute 
veto in respect of interventions in terms of ss 100 and 139 of the Constitution, 
although this power relates to the executive and not legislative powers. 
 
The Bundesrat legislative process also allows for länder to negotiate on issues 
and bills that affect them. Because the Bundesrat is a ‘constitutional body of the 
federation’ consisting of representatives of the federal states, as well as a ‘body’ of 
the federal legislative tier consisting of ‘members of the executive bodies [of federal 
states]’,92 negotiations are essentially between executives representing the länd and 
national spheres of government. Länd participation in federal legislation through the 
Bundesrat is ‘an element of vertical interlocking politics in German federalism’ and 
also ‘constitutes the institutional base for intense cooperation among the [l]änder 
determined to prepare decisions on federal bills’.93 Almost half of the legislation the 
Bundesrat deals with are federal bills.94 Draft government or federal bills (including 
money bills) must first be introduced in the Bundesrat which has ‘the first say’ on 
such bills.95 Federal bills are divided into consent bills (bills that cannot become law 
                                                 
90 Consent bills typically specify the (a) division of responsibility between the federation and 
the länder regarding their legislative, administrative and judicial competences, (b) sharing of 
tax revenue between the federation and the länder and (c) determination of the administrative 
procedures that länder authorities must apply to implement federal bills.  
91 Reuter ibid at 53. In a legislative emergency when the Bundestag has not been dissolved, but 
cannot function and legislate on its own and has no confidence in the Federal Chancellor, the 
Bundesrat constitutes a ‘reserve of legality’ for the Bundestag, which allows it to enact laws of 
the federal government.  
92 Reuter op cit note 63 at 11. 
93 Arthur Benz ‘Intergovernmental Relations in German Federalism — joint decision-making 
and the dynamics of horizontal cooperation’ (nd) at 5, available at 
http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs/2009/2009-03-27-Zaragoza-Benz.pdf, accessed on 17 
September 2015.  
94 Benz op cit note 93 at 5. 
95 In terms of art 76 of the Basic Law. German constitutional reforms in 2006 expanded the 
legislative competences of the länder and consequently almost halved the number of federal or 
consent bills that require Bundesrat consent. 
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without Bundesrat approval) and objection bills. The latter do not require Bundesrat 
consent, but may not be passed if the Bundesrat objects to the bill with a two-thirds 
majority and the Bundestag, the first chamber, is unable to override the Bundesrat’s 
decision with a two-thirds majority vote. The Bundesrat acts as co-decision-maker 
with the Bundestag in respect of consent bills that seek to inter alia modify the 
Basic Law, affect länder finances, and the organisational and administrative 
autonomy of länder.96  
Negotiations on such bills are therefore ‘decisive’ in order to agree on policies 
and also to ‘make arrangements to prevent unintended effects of voting to occur’, ie 
to ensure the votes cast on behalf of a land is unanimous.97 Where a länd is 
governed by a coalition for example, it is advisable that they abstain from voting if 
its cabinet cannot agree on a matter referred to the Bundesrat for a decision. 98 
Requiring decisions on bills to be made in both the länd administration and in the 
Bundesrat helps to facilitate agreement between coalition partners forming a länd 
government and reduce dissent among the länder.99 Recommendations flowing from 
the various groups and committees are referred to the plenary in order for the länd 
governments to decide on their vote in the Bundesrat. In contrast, voting mandates 
to be cast in the NCOP plenary are prepared by provincial legislatures. In Germany, 
decisions on länder voting are ‘coordinated between federal and [l]änder levels of 
the parties’ after which ‘envoys of the [l]änder at the federal level, i.e. special 
ministers of federal affairs, negotiate on the expected votes’ — sometimes informal 
meetings continue until the Bundestag plenary by which time voting on a decision 
on a federal bill is merely a formality.100  
96 Reuter ibid at 40. 
97 Benz ibid at 5. 
98 A länd’s votes on a bill must be unanimous in order to be valid. During voting on a new 
immigration bill in the Bundesrat in 2002 the Minister (a Social Democrat) voted in favour of 
the bill, while the Deputy Premier (a Conservative) voted against the bill on behalf of 
Brandenburg which was governed by a coalition of the two parties. Voting had to be repeated 
due to this irregularity. After the second round of voting the President of the Bundesrat ruled 
that Brandenburg had voted in favour of the bill.98 The German Constitutional Court later 
declared the legislation invalid because Brandenburg’s vote on the bill had not been 
unanimous and was therefore inconsistent with art 78 of the Basic Law.  
99 Benz ibid. 





The NCOP has a six-week legislative cycle to process and pass bills affecting 
provinces, while the Bundesrat has six weeks to submit an opinion or 
recommendation on draft federal legislation. In certain cases a deadline of three 
weeks (for urgent bills), or nine weeks (for bills amending the Basic Law) 
applies.101 The Bundesrat can reject, propose amendments, additions or alternative 
solutions, or state that it has ‘no objections’ to draft federal bills. If it rejects a draft 
federal bill in its entirety, the federal government rarely submits such a bill to the 
Bundestag.102 
 
(b) Constitutional amendments affecting länder and provincial boundaries 
 
In Germany, a constitutional amendment that proposes changes to länder boundaries 
requires a majority vote in a referendum in the affected länder103 and the agreement 
of the Bundestag.104 By contrast, provincial boundary changes in South Africa 
require a constitutional amendment bill in terms of s 74 of the Constitution which 
can only be passed by the NA if the affected province(s) agree to the boundary 
change and six provinces vote in favour of it in the NCOP. The requirement for a 
referendum in Germany shows that länder boundary changes require a wider or a 
higher standard of approval compared to South Africa which only requires the 
agreement of the provincial legislature of the affected province. In both countries, 
however, the regions (and not the national legislature) have the final say on regional 
or provincial boundary changes.  
 
The NCOP has no role in the passing of constitutional amendments that do not (a) 
amend s 1 and s 74(1) of the Constitution or (b) do not affect provinces (ie the 
amendment does not relate to a matter that affects the NCOP, changes provincial 
boundaries, powers, functions or institutions or amend a provision that deals 
specifically with a provincial matter). ‘[I]f the proposed amendment is not an 
                                                 
101 Reuter ibid. The Bundesrat’s checks-and-balances role is manifested particularly clearly in 
this context. 
102 Reuter ibid at 35. 
103 Article 29(3) of the Basic Law. 





amendment that is required to be passed by the Council’105 details thereof must be 
submitted to the Council for a public debate. In Germany, amendments to the Basic 
Law require the supporting votes of two-thirds of Bundestag and two-thirds of 
Bundesrat members.106 Constitutional amendments ‘affecting the division of the 
Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or 
the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20’107 are not allowed, ie provisions 
pertaining to human rights and human dignity and Germany’s constitutional order as 
a democratic and social federal state.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The South African Parliament’s second chamber, the NCOP, has evolved 
significantly from a Westminster upper house that represented the white elite to a 
second chamber that is not only more representative of a democratic South Africa, 
but also represents provincial interests in the national Parliament. The NP-packed 
Senate of the 1950s had played a central role in passing unjust laws and the 
government’s attempts to remove coloureds from the common voters’ role as a 
result of which South Africa narrowly avoided a constitutional crisis, severely 
dented the Senate’s reputation. 
 
The NCOP is based on the Bundesrat but with distinct differences. Both 
chambers represent the regions (provinces and länder) but the NCOP’s membership 
comprises politicians while the Bundesrat are run by länd executives (mainly 
government officials). This difference affects how decisions are made on especially 
bills that affect the länder and provinces. Länd executives are responsible for 
implementing legislation and can input directly, whereas NCOP delegates need to 
consult with the provincial executives and get public input on bills that provinces 
must implement. The NCOP’s elaborate mandating process to obtain provincial 
mandates and decisions on bills arguably ‘makes NCOP processes extraordinarily 
                                                 
105 S 74(5)(c). 
106 Art 79(2).  
107 Art 79(3). 
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complex’108 compared to the Bundesrat’s processes. This complexity and the 
different routes prescribed for ss 74, 75 and 76 bills in the NCOP, further 
distinguish the NCOP from the Bundesrat.109  
‘[A] fundamental purpose of the Constitution [is] to bind the provinces into national 
government, to see them as spheres within a single whole, rather than as 
autonomous, independent entities’.110 The NCOP was designed to represent 
provinces at the national level and to play a mediating role between the different 
spheres of government. To this end it has certain characteristics and processes that 
might be considered elaborate or even excessive compared to the Bundesrat. 
Nonetheless, mandating procedures requiring mandates from the provincial 
legislatures were considered necessary ‘add-ons’ to strengthen our democracy 
considering South Africa’s turbulent political history and the unique requirements 
for its new democracy post 1994. Because of the system of semi-autonomous 
provinces, mandating requires provincial participation (including public 
participation) in the NCOP in respect of national legislation affecting provinces and 
were intended to enhance democracy — that is why the Constitution requires in s 
70(2)(b) that the NCOP rules and orders ‘must provide for...the participation of all 
the provinces in [NCOP] proceedings in a manner consistent with democracy’. This, 
and other aspects of the mandating process, are discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter dealing with the MPPA. 
108 Murray (1999) ibid. 
109 According to Murray (1999) ibid the procedure in terms of which s 75 and s 76 legislation 
follows different routes through the NCOP introduced a complication not encountered in the 
Bundesrat process. Similarly, the constitutional emphasis on public participation in legislative 
processes in every sphere of government (including provincial legislatures, the NA and the 
NCOP) also makes demands on the NCOP not envisaged by the Bundesrat. The NCOP’s 
involvement in constitutional amendments is limited, in contrast to the role of the Bundesrat. 
110 Christina Murray and Richard Simeon ‘From paper to practice: the National Council of 
Provinces after its first year’ (1999) 14 SAPR/PL at 98. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MANDATING PROCEDURES OF PROVINCES ACT 52 OF 2008 
1. Introduction
Section 65(2) of the Constitution requires an ‘Act of Parliament, enacted in 
accordance with the procedure established by either subsection (1) or subsection (2) 
of section 76, [to] provide for a uniform procedure in terms of which provincial 
legislatures confer authority on their delegations to cast votes on their behalf’. This 
provision speaks to the heart of provincial participation in the NCOP. Provincial 
legislatures must mandate or instruct their provincial delegations during the 
legislative process regarding which amendments to propose and, finally, whether or 
not to vote in support of a bill before the NCOP. Until the Act was passed, item 
21(5) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution provided transitional arrangements which 
specified that provinces could use their Standing Rules to confer mandates on their 
delegations to the NCOP.  
The Act required by s 65(2) of the Constitution was finally adopted in 2008 as 
the Mandating Procedures of Provinces Act 52 of 2008 (MPPA), and was assented 
to in 2009. The MPPA regulates the manner in which the voices of provinces are to 
be taken into account in Parliament’s legislative processes in the consideration of s 
74 and s 76 bills that affect provinces.  
In this Chapter I provide an overview of the mandating processes in terms of the 
MPPA. I briefly set out the MPPA’s objectives and certain requirements in respect 
of mandates and explain how it fits into the constitutional role of the NCOP. Where 
relevant, I also refer to applicable provisions in the Constitution and the NCOP 
Rules. The discussion of the MPPA serves as an introduction to the case studies in 
Chapter 4 in which I illustrate some of the challenges encountered in the mandating 
processes in practice, and suggest possible solutions in instances where the MPPA is 
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either silent or does not address an issue adequately. I do not draw conclusions on 
the MPPA’s effectiveness in addressing current and past challenges concerning 
mandates in this Chapter — I do so in Chapter 4. 
2. Objectives of the MPPA
According to its Long Title, the MPPA was enacted to give effect to s 65(2) of the 
Constitution and ‘to provide for matters incidental thereto’. The Preamble states that 
the MPPA was enacted because, 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures recognise[d] the need for uniformity 
amongst the provinces in respect of the procedure for the conferring of 
authority by a provincial legislature on its delegation to the National Council of 
Provinces to cast a vote on behalf of that legislature. 
The Minutes of the Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs 
that dealt with the Mandating Procedures of Provinces Bill [B8F-2007] (‘mandating 
bill’), show that the challenges at the time were mostly administrative in nature.111 
They could have been remedied through, for example, improved co-ordination and 
communication between the NCOP and provinces.112 Possibly, amendments to the 
NCOP Rules could also have addressed challenges like the late submission of 
mandates, incorrect version of bills stated in mandates and confusion regarding 
when a provincial legislature committee or a full sitting of the house could confer 
authority. The introduction of the mandating bill in 2007 was most likely triggered 
by a realisation that s 21(1) of the Constitution required mandating legislation to be 
enacted ‘within a reasonable period of the date the new Constitution took effect’, 
whereas ten years had passed since the Constitution’s commencement in 1997.  
111 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Security and Constitutional Affairs Select committee 
Draft Legislation on Provincial Mandates: Briefing’ 8 August 2006, available at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7152/, accessed on 16 September 2015. 
112 The terms ‘province’ and ‘provincial legislature’ are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
Unless otherwise stated, a reference to a province must be construed as a reference to a 
provincial legislature. 
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Prior to the MPPA each province’s mandating procedures were set out in their 
Standing Rules.113 When the mandating bill was considered in the NCOP, the 
Eastern Cape insisted that there should be no ‘interference’ with provinces and that 
their own rules should not be discarded.114 None of the other provinces were 
concerned about their own procedures being regulated as the MPPA would 
‘augment’ their Standing Rules and provide a broad framework to ensure that 
provinces observed their own ‘constitutionally compliant internal arrangements’, 
and fill any existing legislative gaps.115 Nonetheless, some provinces had to change 
their practices to adhere to the uniform mandating procedures. After its enactment, 
provincial legislatures included the MPPA’s provisions in their Standing Rules. 
The MPPA specifies which information must appear on final mandates submitted to 
the Council. It determines that certain mandates require a committee of the 
provincial legislature to confer authority, whereas authority for final mandates 
which indicate how the provincial delegation will vote in the NCOP, must be 
conferred by the provincial legislature sitting in plenary.  
3. Mandates
In simple terms a mandate is the authority a provincial legislature gives to its 
provincial delegation to act on its behalf in the NCOP, whether to negotiate, propose 
amendments or vote on a bill affecting provinces116 or a question before the NCOP. 
A mandate can be ‘open’ and give the delegation wide discretion to act; or limited 
(for example, to negotiate within specified parameters). A mandate can also be 
specific to a particular bill or question before the NCOP. This is most often the case 
when the provincial delegation is given specific instructions regarding which 
amendments the province wants effected in a bill in the NCOP select committee, 
and how the province will vote in the NCOP plenary when the bill is passed. The 
113 Item 21(5) Sch 6 of the Constitution. 
114 Parliamentary Monitoring Group op cit note 111. 
115 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ibid. 
116 Unless otherwise indicated, the reference to a ‘bill’ in the context of this chapter is a 
reference to a s 74 or s 76 bill. 
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MPPA’s requirement that negotiating mandates conform to Schedule 1 and that final 
mandates conform to Schedule 2 of the MPPA indicates that mandates on bills 
affecting provinces must be in writing.117 Arguably, a mandate on any other 
question before the NCOP listed in s 65 of the Constitution (for example the 
election of the NCOP Chairperson or the revival of a bill) need not be in writing as 
only so-called voting mandates would be required. 
3.1 Steps in the mandating process 
As I discuss in Chapter 1, the mandating process involves multiple stages and 
requires that provinces conduct public consultations on bills before they develop and 
confer mandates on their provincial delegations to the NCOP. I also mention the 
importance of the negotiating mandate stage which is the litmus test of the extent 
provinces want to, and can, accommodate each other’s unique and diverse needs 
and/or interests in bills affecting provinces. The final mandate indicates to the 
NCOP select committee whether a province will vote in support of the bill or 
against the bill, or abstain from voting in the NCOP plenary. Notwithstanding the 
submission of final mandates, provinces can reconsider their mandates as the next 
and final step requires provinces to submit voting mandates which the head of the 
provincial delegation casts on behalf of the province in the NCOP plenary. 
3.2 Types of mandates defined in the MPPA 
Section 1 of the MPPA distinguishes between four types of mandates, namely 
‘legislative’, ‘negotiating’, ‘final’ and ‘voting’ mandates. Section 1 must be read 
together with s 3 of the MPPA which prescribes what ‘uniform’ information must 
appear on a final mandate in order for it to be valid. In essence mandates must 
conform to the formats set out in Sch 1 and 2 of the MPPA. The different types of 
mandates listed in the table below correspond to the various stages of the mandating 
process that must be concluded within a six-week legislative period prescribed by 
117 Section 3 of the MPPA. 
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NCOP Rule 240. Thus ‘negotiating’ mandates apply during the negotiations phase 
in the NCOP select committee, while ‘voting’ mandates are required to cast the 









Sets out the parameters for negotiations in 
the NCOP committee. Can be specific (eg 
propose specific amendments) or ‘open’ 








A mandate presented to the relevant NCOP 
committee indicating how the provincial 








Instructs the provincial delegation to vote in 
favour of or against the bill, or abstain from 







General term covering both ‘negotiating’ 
and ‘final’ mandates, possibly including 
‘voting’ mandates. In addition to s 74 and s 
76 bills, legislative mandates are required for 
the election of the Chairperson and Deputy 
Chairperson of the NCOP and decisions of 










118 The applicable stages or weeks in the legislative cycle are not always adhered to. In 
addition to the Parliamentary calendar and/or programme the days when a committee or the 
legislature sits also affects in which week the various mandates are dealt with.  
119 The NCOP Rules are silent on whether a voting mandate can instruct a province to 
introduce an amendment in plenary — considering that legislation is processed in committees 
and that the plenary in reality considers the committee’s report on a bill (which would 
recommend the adoption or in rare cases rejection of the bill), a province would possibly need 
to bring a motion for the Rules to be suspended in order to allow the bill to be referred back to 
the committee for consideration of the proposed amendment only. After this the bill would 
need to be placed back on the Order Paper for provinces to vote on it in the NCOP plenary.  
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The following sections explain the types of mandates applicable to ss 74 and 76 bills 
affecting provinces, as mandating procedures in the NCOP most often concern such 
bills. 
3.2.1 Negotiating mandates 
The MPPA groups ‘negotiating’ and ‘final’ mandates together under ‘legislative’ 
mandates. The first type of mandate required in the mandating process is the 
‘negotiating’ mandate which s 1 of the MPPA defines as: 
[T]he conferral of authority by a committee designated by a provincial
legislature on its provincial delegation to the NCOP of parameters for
negotiation when the relevant NCOP select committee considers a [b]ill after
tabling and before consideration of final mandates, and may include proposed
amendments to the [b]ill.
Negotiating mandates do not require a full sitting of the provincial legislature to be 
valid. Some provinces120 set out very specific instructions in their negotiating 
mandates on how their delegates must negotiate, what the MPPA describes as the 
‘parameters for negotiation’. They may also include the proposed wording for 
proposed amendments to a bill. Sometimes provinces instruct their delegations to 
abstain from negotiating. As noted above, some negotiating mandates are ‘open’. 
Following negotiations, the amended bill or unchanged bill flowing from the 
negotiations process is sent to provinces to consider and prepare final mandates.  
120 ‘Province’ and ‘provincial legislature’ are used interchangeably in this chapter as a 
provincial legislature’s mandate represents the views of the public representatives in the 
provincial legislature.  
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3.2.2 Final mandates 
The MPPA defines a ‘final mandate’ as the ‘conferral of authority by a provincial 
legislature on its provincial delegation to the NCOP to cast a vote when the relevant 
NCOP select committee considers a [b]ill or prior to voting thereon in an NCOP 
[p]lenary’121 (an ordinary sitting of the NCOP). Whereas a ‘final’ mandate usually
indicates how the provincial legislature intends to vote on the bill during the NCOP
plenary, the word ‘final’ is possibly misleading or misplaced as the next and final
stage in the passage of the bill through the NCOP also requires a mandate. Under
the Act this last (final) mandate is referred to as the ‘voting mandate’. It is possible
for a province to change its mind and confer a voting mandate that is different from
its final mandate.
3.2.3 Voting mandates 
After the select committee adopts the bill with a supporting vote of five or six 
provinces (depending on whether it is a s 74 or a s 76 bill) , the bill is referred to the 
Council to be passed. For the bill to be adopted, provinces must submit a ‘voting’ 
mandate to the Council. A ‘voting mandate’ is defined as ‘the conferral of authority 
by a provincial legislature on the head of its provincial delegation to the NCOP to 
cast a vote on a [b]ill in an NCOP plenary’. A voting mandate instructs the 
provincial delegation to vote in favour of or against the bill, or abstain from voting 
in the NCOP plenary. In terms of s 4 of the MPPA, ‘[a] Premier of a province’ (the 
head of the delegation in terms of s 60(3) of the Constitution) ‘or a delegate of a 
provincial delegation to the NCOP designated by the Premier, must cast the vote on 
behalf of a provincial legislature’.  





3.2.4 Legislative mandates 
 
The MPPA unnecessarily and confusingly distinguishes between ‘voting’ mandates 
which concern the final vote on a bill in the plenary of the NCOP, and ‘legislative’ 
mandates which refers to questions before the NCOP, which also includes bills. A 
legislative mandate is defined in s 1 as,  
 
the conferral of authority by a provincial legislature on its provincial delegation 
to the NCOP to cast a vote on a question contemplated in― (a) section 64 of 
the Constitution [questions concerning the election of the Chairperson and 
Deputy Chairperson of the Council]; (b) section 74 of the Constitution 
[constitutional amendments affecting provinces]; (c) section 76 of the 
Constitution [ordinary legislation affecting provinces]; or (d) section 78 of the 
Constitution [the Mediation Committee].  
 
It is unclear whether the legislative drafters intended for a legislative mandate to be 
broader than a voting mandate (ie cover all mandates), or whether it was careless 
drafting, because there is no substantive difference between legislative and voting 
mandates. Questions in terms of s 65 include bills. In addition ‘legislative’ and 
‘voting’ mandates both instruct the provincial delegation how to vote in the NCOP 
plenary.  
 
4. Implementing provincial participation in the NCOP 
 
In terms of the MPPA provinces must submit both negotiating and final mandates in 
respect of s 74 and s 76 bills. This forces all provinces to participate in all of the 
mandating processes (my emphasis), even those that are not directly affected by eg a 
constitutional amendment bill that proposes that a specific province change its 
provincial boundary. Even when a province intends to abstain from voting in the 
NCOP it must confer a voting mandate on its delegation to instruct it not to vote 
during the NCOP plenary. This requires, in my view correctly, that all provinces 
attend the NCOP plenary and means that they cannot simply boycott proceedings.  
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Regarding the submission of voting mandates to the Council in terms of s 8(1) 
of the MPPA, s 8(2) provides that if a province decides not to change its vote after 
the consideration of final mandates in the select committee, then the provincial 
delegation to the NCOP must (my emphasis) table the province’s final mandate in 
the NCOP plenary as its voting mandate. Provinces can reconsider their mandates 
and change their votes right up to the voting stage in the Council, as long as these 
are submitted to the Council on time. In such an event the province usually makes a 
Declaration of Vote in terms of NCOP Rule 71.122 This is a short statement that the 
designated delegate makes in the Council plenary to explain that the province 
changed its vote and why the ‘final’ and ‘voting’ mandates are different. A 
Declaration of Vote is done before the commencement of voting in the NCOP 
chamber.  
The provision in the NCOP Rules for a province to change its mandate, right up to 
voting in the Council, is extremely important and useful for provinces, considering 
the tight time-frames that govern the mandating process. The NCOP’s six-week 
legislative cycle effectively allows for only one negotiating meeting. NCOP and 
provincial politicians often have insufficient time to debate matters in depth, take 
opposing or different views expressed during negotiations back to their own 
provinces and return to the NCOP with further instructions from their provinces. 
The conferral of a new final or voting mandate is sometimes delayed because 
provincial legislatures sit in plenary on different days of the week which sometimes 
coincide with the plenary scheduled in the NCOP. Thus, allowing provinces to 
submit a new mandate, even at the eleventh hour, ensures that provinces with latter 
sittings, for example, can still participate in voting in the NCOP plenary. In this way 
the NCOP accommodates the unique challenges and needs of the different 
provinces. It also ensures that negotiating meetings, in particular, are not mere 
formalities to comply with the Constitution and the MPPA, but are intended for 
provinces to have meaningful interaction with one another on issues that affect 
them. The Declaration of Vote also ensures that a province can explain the reasons 
for its change of heart which is likely to have occurred only after careful 





consideration of the issues. Notwithstanding the views a province may have had on 
a bill, nothing is settled until its vote is cast in the Council.  
 
5. Selected issues relating to mandating procedures in terms of the MPPA  
 
5.1 Ambiguous distinction between mandate types 
 
As I note above, there is some ambiguity in how the MPPA defines the different 
types of mandates, and in some respects the MPPA unnecessarily distinguishes 
between them. For example, the differences between ‘mandate’ and ‘final mandate’, 
as well as between ‘final’ and ‘voting’ mandates are not clear and appear to be 
superfluous.  
 
Section 1 of the MPPA defines ‘mandates’ as the ‘conferral of authority by a 
provincial legislature on its provincial delegation to the NCOP to cast a vote in 
compliance with the requirements under section 3’. Although conferral by a 
committee of a provincial legislature is technically also conferral by the provincial 
legislature as the provincial legislature’s rules authorise its committees to act on its 
behalf, in my view the requirement for a conferral of a final mandate during plenary 
introduces a stricter voting requirement (compared to the conferral of a negotiating 
mandate by a committee of the legislature). In addition, the definition of ‘mandate’ 
is not strictly correct as the term refers broadly to the four types of mandates defined 
in the MPPA which, as I mentioned previously, are in some instances conferred by a 
committee of the provincial legislature and in other instances during a plenary of the 
provincial legislature. Mandates are also required for negotiations which do not 
involve voting.  
 
5.2 Final mandates are restricted to provincial vote  
 
Final mandates can only indicate whether a province says ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a bill or 





provinces from proposing further amendments in their final mandates. Because the 
MPPA must give effect to s 65(2) of the Constitution, it cannot and does not place 
limitations on the final mandate phase — to do so would be unconstitutional as this 
would restrict provinces’ ability to use the NCOP plenary as a forum in which to 
debate provincial views. The MPPA prescribes (in my view the minimum (my 
emphasis)) requirements for final mandates to be valid — authority must be 
conferred by the provincial legislature sitting in plenary and the information 
required on the prescribed format in the MPPA schedule confirms this. However, 
the NCOP’s six-week legislative cycle (and not the MPPA) limits further 
opportunity for provinces to engage on the bill beyond one negotiating meeting. 
Various provincial and NCOP role players have complained that the final mandate 
phase in the NCOP committee is too mechanical.123 While the Rules of Parliament 
can set limits, the CC held in 2013 in Mazibuko v Sisulu and Another,124 with 
reference to its majority judgement in Oriani-Ambrosini v Sisulu, Speaker of the 
National Assembly,125 that, in prescribing a procedure for an envisaged process set 
out in the Constitution, the NA Rules cannot ‘thwart or frustrate the steps and 
thereby negate a constitutional entitlement’.126 In my view the principle applies 
equally to the NCOP — therefore its facilitative processes and rules that set 
legislative time-frames should facilitate, and not render ineffective, provinces’ right 
to participate fully in the NCOP’s legislative processes.  
 
5.3 The impact of the legislative cycle on mandating and decision-making 
 
I discuss in Chapter 2 that the six-week legislative time-frame applicable to s 76 
bills and the provision for its extension is prescribed by NCOP Rule 240, and not 
the MPPA itself. Providing for an extension is an administrative process in terms of 
which the Chairperson of the select committee writes to the Chairperson of the 
NCOP setting out the reasons why an extension is requested.  
                                                 
123 Anonymous ibid.  
124 (CCT 115/12) [2013] ZACC 28; 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC); 2013 (11) BCLR 1297 (CC) (27 
August 2013). 
125 [2012] ZACC 27; 2012 (6) SA 588 (CC); 2013 (1) BCLR 14 (CC).  






While it would have been acceptable for a ‘uniform procedure’ to include a 
time-frame, it is commendable that the MPPA does not prescribe a time-frame for 
completing the mandating process — it would make the process very rigid if the Act 
dictated every single step. As it is, strict adherence to this cycle and the NCOP 
Rules sometimes result in a very ‘mechanical’ process. The short legislative period 
places tremendous pressure on provinces and the NCOP to finalise legislation. This, 
in turn, impacts on the effectiveness of the mandating process and the extent to 
which provinces participate in the NCOP’s legislative processes. 
 
The start of the various stages of the six-week legislative cycle has 
implications for the calculation of the time available for provinces to conduct public 
hearings and how many negotiating meetings can take place. Provincial legislatures 
sit once a week. This can sometimes delay matters in the NCOP process as voting or 
final mandates must be conferred during a plenary of the provincial legislature. 
According to a NCOP committee secretary, the inclusion of the Council plenary in 
the sixth week ‘effectively steal[s] a week away from public participation’.127 
 
If provinces insisted on more time for public consultations and negotiations, 
most bills affecting provinces could not be processed within six weeks, meaning 
more extensions would be required. Effectively, the six-week legislative cycle 
allows for only one negotiating meeting. This means that the ‘permanent delegate 
has to sit in [the negotiating] meeting and fight tooth and nail to get what he wants 
for his province, because once that meeting is finished [negotiations are] 
finished’.128 There simply is not enough time, without taking time away from public 
participation in the provinces (one week in terms of this cycle), for the select 
committee to consider negotiating mandates beyond that first negotiating meeting. 
The MPPA compels the select committee to produce a ‘C’ list of amendments and a 
D-version of the bill incorporating the amendments soon after the negotiating 
                                                 
127 Asgar Bawa Committee Secretary: Select Committee on Land and Mineral Resources, 
interviewed on 28 August 2013. 





mandate meeting, as provincial legislatures need to consider the text of the amended 
bill and the committee report in order to confer final mandates in its weekly plenary.  
 
Because the NCOP must ensure its committees finalise legislation timeously it 
would not be feasible to abolish the legislative cycle. Ideally, the cycle should be 
extended in consultation with provinces and the NA to a period long enough to 
allow provinces to consult properly and develop mandates, and also allow enough 
time in the NCOP and the NA to process the bill without creating bottlenecks.129 
The NA’s Second Term Programme dated 14 May 2015, reflects a proposal for an 
eight-week legislative cycle for bills affecting provinces. However, by 17 October 
2015 the NCOP Rules had not been amended in order for this to become effective.  
 
Apart from to the NCOP’s programme, the number of bills transmitted to the 
NCOP by the NA which must be dealt with by fewer NCOP committees and NCOP 
delegates compared to their counterparts in the NA, impact significantly on the time 
available for serious deliberation on bills. NCOP committees are clustered, often 
overseeing four or more departments. This means that four or more NA portfolio 
committees can refer bills to a single select committee for processing at one time. 
An NCOP Rule 243 extension has limited scope if an NCOP committee that is 
inundated with bills from various NA committees is pressed for time because it is 
near the end of an annual legislative cycle or, as was the case in 2014, the end of the 
term of a Parliament.130 The Fourth Parliament’s Select Committee on Security and 
Constitutional Development eg processed 37 bills (including six s 76 bills) during 
its term.131 In February 2014 and March 2014 alone, it processed four s 76 bills.132 
Thus, in two months it adopted almost half of the s 76 bills it had adopted on 
                                                 
129 Parliament of South Africa ‘Parliamentary Programme 2015 Second Term as agreed by the 
NA Programme Committee on 14 May 2015’ at 5. 
130 This also places enormous pressure on the provincial legislatures and delegates who must 
juggle between different bills and dart between provinces and the NCOP; and between 
committee meetings and NCOP plenaries. 
131 Parliament of South Africa ‘Legacy Report of the Select Committee on Security and 
Constitutional Development (June 2009 – March 2014)’ Announcements Tablings and 
Committee Reports 38 Sixth Session Fourth Parliament (2014)  2353–2369. 
132 Negotiations were held on all four bills, but only three went through to final mandates 
meetings. The Committee could not proceed beyond the February negotiating mandate meeting 





average during its entire term from June 2009 to 28 March 2014. While it is unlikely 
that most NCOP committees would experience such extreme pressure to process 
bills affecting provinces in such a short space of time, the example illustrates that it 
can happen in practice and that mechanisms need to be put in place to prepare for 
this kind of eventualities. In addition to extending the legislative period applicable 
to such bills, broader political interventions should also be considered, eg an 
agreement with the Leader of government business or Cabinet on the maximum 
number of ss 76 and 74 bills and the dates by which they must be introduced in 
Parliament in a term or year.  
 
The negotiating stage presents a unique opportunity for provinces to 
participate in the NCOP’s mandating processes with actual leverage. This is 
unfortunately also the stage that is perhaps the most neglected — partly because of 
the tight legislative cycle and partly because provinces have not fully realised their 
power to bring about a desired outcome provided they use negotiations optimally. 
The aim of negotiations is for provinces to agree on proposed amendments to bills 
affecting provinces. To unleash the full potential of negotiations, the mandating 
process should be sufficiently flexible and allow enough time for provinces to reach 
consensus. Conversely, a rigid approach in dealing with negotiating mandates will 
limit and frustrate the process, instead of taking it forward. 
 
In the discussion below I illustrate how the MPPA’s silence on some of the aspects 
of negotiations have contributed to the rigidity in the negotiating process which, in 







5.4 The impact of a rigid negotiating process on provincial participation  
 
(a) The MPPA (in my view correctly) does not prescribe how the negotiating 
process must unfold. 
 
Effective negotiations presuppose a consistent and correct application and 
interpretation of the applicable constitutional provisions and NCOP Rules and 
depend on the political will of role players. Inconsistent and incorrect application of 
the NCOP Rules and the Constitution has led to certain specific challenges, some of 
them unforeseen. For example, the provision in the Constitution that a decision in 
the NCOP is decided when five provinces vote in favour thereof, was strictly and in 
my view, incorrectly, applied in the context of a negotiating meeting on the 
Traditional Courts Bill 2012 that was held on 12 February 2014.133 As a result, no 
real negotiations were possible and the meeting was adjourned soon after it started, 
having accomplished nothing. The Select Committee expected the majority of five 
provinces to either support or reject the bill in their mandates in terms of s 65 of the 
Constitution which really should only apply to voting in the NCOP plenary. 
However, the negotiating meeting deadlocked because four provinces rejected the 
bill while four were in favour of the bill with proposed amendments; and one 
(KwaZulu-Natal) abstained from voting. No real negotiations could take place as 
provinces were unwilling to shift their positions on the bill and a quorum of seven 
provinces notwithstanding, the meeting had to adjourn as it could not comply with 
the Select Committee’s expectation and/or interpretation that a majority of five 
provinces needed to vote in favour of the bill with proposed amendments or reject 
the bill.  
 
  
                                                 
133 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Meeting of the Select Committee on Security and 
Constitutional Development. Traditional Courts Bill [B1–2012]: consideration of negotiating 
mandates’ 12 February 2014, available at http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20140212-traditional-





(b) The MPPA does not clarify whether or not provinces that oppose a bill may 
refuse to propose amendments and may abstain from negotiations.  
 
If a mandate does not expressly state that a province opposes a bill, the logical 
conclusion is that it supports the bill. The province should then indicate whether or 
not its support is subject to proposed amendments. Technically speaking, the 
difference between a mandate that opposes a bill with proposed amendments and 
one that supports a bill subject to amendments is cosmetic, as both want the bill to 
be amended. In instances where a provincial delegation has an open mandate it 
would be possible for a delegation to change its position on a bill or a specific 
amendment during the course of negotiations without the need to revert to the 
province. Ideally, a negotiating mandate should propose amendments, but also give 
the delegation enough discretion to accommodate other provinces’ views if so 
persuaded during negotiations. After the meeting, if time allows, the province can be 
engaged further on possibly changing its position on a bill. Because the six-week 
legislative cycle does not allow for more than one negotiating meeting, provinces 
that support the bill but do not agree to the proposed amendments are forced to 
either oppose the bill or abstain from voting. This is clearly not ideal. A longer 
legislative period would at least afford such provinces another opportunity to 
negotiate before submitting final mandates. Should South Africa’s political 
landscape change in the future to the extent that the ANC no longer control the 
majority of provinces, for example, the legislative period will likely need to be 
extended to allow sufficient time to traverse diverse provincial and national views, 
as well as diverse party-political views. Should this happen the Rules of Parliament 
can easily be amended to provide for changing political needs. 
 
(c) The MPPA does not require five provinces to vote in favour of a proposed 
amendment during negotiations.  
 
This could be left until provinces vote on the final list of amendments on the bill, in 
other words the final mandate. If one considers that the negotiating mandates merely 





scope within which to work. Ideally, delegations should determine the process of 
negotiations. What approach must be followed in instances where more than one 
province propose amendments on the same clause but with different wording and/or 
emphasis? Forcing delegations to reject the proposals of another province on clauses 
or issues that were not proposed by their own provinces could give rise to 
unintended consequences. Provinces will in any event indicate in their final and 
voting mandates whether or not they support an amended bill. Alternatively, 
consideration should be given to holding another round of negotiations if most 
provinces insist on this, even if it means extending the legislative cycle. For 
practical reasons, if it emerges in a negotiating meeting that provinces can agree on 
a new provision or a proposed amendment that would require careful drafting to 
ensure it is consistent with the rest of the bill and the Constitution, there should be 
an opportunity for it to be professionally drafted (usually by the department) and 
returned to the select committee for consideration or further deliberation if 
necessary — the same process followed by NA committees when amending bills. 
 
An effective negotiating meeting requires an effective and decisive chairperson to 
steer discussions, try and prevent a deadlock, and make decisions. Deadlocks are 
sometimes unavoidable because delegations negotiate within the perimeters 
determined by their respective provinces. Whether a ‘deadlock’ is sufficient to 
derail real negotiations is also a matter of interpretation. All efforts should be made 
to try and end the deadlock, including finding political solutions outside the 
negotiating meeting in order to get provinces to agree. An unresolved deadlock in 
respect of a bill could result in a rejected or lapsed bill. 
 
5.5 Decisions to revive a bill  
 
In terms of NCOP Rule 238(1), a bill lapses if the Council has not passed the bill 
when it rises on the last sitting day in an annual session. The bill may, however, be 
reinstated on the Order Paper during the next ensuing session by way of a resolution 






Should provinces play a more defined role in the decision whether or not to 
revive a bill; and should this be done by way of mandate? Provinces, in terms of s 
76 of the Constitution, have a right to participate in the NCOP’s legislative process. 
In terms of s 65(1)(b) of the Constitution all questions in the NCOP are decided 
when five provinces vote in favour thereof. At first glance a vote by a province on a 
question whether a bill should be revived would require a mandate from provinces. 
The MPPA is silent regarding mandates when the NCOP has to decide on a question 
to revive a bill. The mandates covered by the MPPA concern certain questions only 
— the revival of bills (including bills affecting provinces) is excluded from this list.  
 
In terms of current practice, the Chief Whip of the Council brings a draft 
motion before Council in terms of NCOP Rule 74(b) that states that any member of 
the Council may propose a draft resolution for approval as a resolution of the 
Council. The Council can pass the resolution with a majority of votes of members in 
the Council. The decision to revive a bill is thus a political decision which is given 
effect to by the NCOP’s programming committee and administration. According to 
an NCOP Table staff member:  
 
Section 65 should be read in conjunction with the Mandating Procedures of 
Provinces Act, which list instances when mandates are required from 
provinces...[S]ince the Act does not require mandates for the revival of bills, 
delegation heads will vote without necessarily submitting a “mandate”. Usually 
a list of bills that the NCOP intends to revive will be forwarded to provinces in 
advance. Once revived the bill is still going to go through the legislative 
process. Therefore, provinces would still pronounce themselves on the bill.134  
 
I disagree with this view because the NCOP’s approach appears to be based 
on (a) the MPPA’s omission of questions regarding the revival of bills from the list 
of questions requiring mandates, (b) the provision in the Constitution that the NCOP 
can regulate its own business, and (c) an incorrect interpretation of s 65 of the 
Constitution. The practice followed to revive bills in the NCOP is clearly wrong as s 
65(1) states that ‘[e]xcept where the Constitution provides otherwise...each province 
has one vote, which is cast on behalf of the province by the head of its delegation’ 
                                                 





— ie a vote directed by the province in its mandate. The only exception to this 
provision (when a mandate is not required) is in s 75(2) which states that ‘[w]hen 
the [NCOP] votes on a question in terms of [s 75], section 65 does not apply, 
instead...each delegate in a provincial delegation has one vote [and] the question is 
decided by a majority of the votes cast’.135 A vote according to a province’s 
direction requires a mandate (written or otherwise). This means the MPPA must be 
‘read in conjunction with’ s 65 of the Constitution, and not vice versa, as the MPPA 
must give effect to s 65. Thus, all questions before the NCOP (except those 
concerning s 75 bills) require mandates and should be voted on by the provincial 
delegations on behalf of provinces, not individuals.  
 
A mandate regarding the revival of a bill can be ‘open’ and need not be specific to 
the issue, and does not need to be in writing. The delegation must act within the 
authority that the provincial legislature confers on it, and a provincial legislature can 
confer an open mandate on its delegation and allow it to decide how to vote on 
certain questions before the NCOP (except votes to pass s 74 and s 76 bills which 
require specific mandates under the MPPA). In the case of open mandates the leader 
of the delegation would, however, need to consult other members in the delegation 
concerning how to vote. This means that a province can also not mandate the leader 
of the delegation alone to decide without consulting the rest of the delegation, 
because s 60(1) of the Constitution specifically refers to ‘a single delegation from 
each province consisting of ten delegates’ and not an individual. In the same manner 
that the validity of legislation or decisions of the NCOP can be challenged in court 
for not complying with the technical or procedural requirements set out in the 
Constitution, a mandate conferred on a provincial delegation would also be invalid 
if eg the composition of the delegation does not comply with the specifics set out in 
the Constitution.  
 
                                                 
135 Although voting on international agreements do not require mandates ito NCOP Rule 73A(1), the 
head of the provincial delegation casts a vote on behalf of the province which is, strictly speaking, 







During the workshop on the implementation of the NCOP in 1996, the then Minister 
of Provincial and Local Government, Valli Moosa, indicated that the idea of 
promoting provincial interests during the mandating process was to ensure that the 
debate takes place in the provinces at all times. In this chapter I allude to some of 
the implementation challenges of the MPPA and their impact on provincial 
participation in the NCOP’s legislative processes. The case studies in Chapter 4 
provide a more detailed illustration of the practical implementation of the MPPA 










1. Introduction  
 
Earlier chapters allude to the shortcomings of the mandating procedures. In this 
chapter I illustrate some of the challenges encountered in practice by way of case 
studies. I also suggest possible solutions in instances where the MPPA is either 
silent on specific issues, or does not address them adequately; and, finally, I reflect 
on the participation of provinces in the mandating process. 
 
Three of the four case studies concern s 76 bills and one concerns a s 75 bill: 
 
(i) The Traditional Courts Bill [B1-2012] (‘TCB’) fell under s 76. It was processed 
after the enactment of the MPPA and dealt with customary law and practice, which 
the Constitution lists in Schedule 4136 and thus is covered by s 76(3). The TCB 
discussion considers, among other things, the requirement of adequate public 
consultation, the value and purpose of the NCOP’s public consultation and its 
impact on provincial mandates. The negotiations on this bill were problematic due 
to the incorrect interpretation of voting requirements in the NCOP (perhaps driven 
by party interests) which led to undue tension and delay in processing the bill when 
voting in the select committee reached a stalemate. The MPPA is silent on how a 
committee should proceed when negotiations reach a stalemate and there is no 
decisive vote to either accept or reject the bill. I consider the implication of this for 
voting in the NCOP. 
 
(ii) In the second s 76 bill case study, the Legal Practice Bill [B20D-2012] (‘LPB’), 
I discuss the provision in NCOP Rule 63 for a minority view in the committee report 
                                                 





and a Declaration of Vote prior to voting on a question before the Council.137 These 
provisions are important and useful for provinces, especially where bills affect 
provinces, to ensure that their voices are heard throughout the legislative process in 
the NCOP.138 I also consider the role of opposition delegates in the mandating 
process. 
 
(iii) The National Environmental Management Act (Integrated Coastal 
Management) Amendment Bill [B40B-2007] (‘Coastal Management Bill’) (s 76) 
discussion illustrates selected challenges before the enactment of the MPPA. It also 
illustrates how consulting provinces from the policy development phase can ensure 
their buy-in and contribute to a relatively smooth mandating process. Although the 
Constitution spells out that provinces directly affected by a bill must be consulted, 
the Constitution and the MPPA are silent on the participation of provinces not 
directly affected by s 74 or s 76 bills. The Coastal Management Bill concerned only 
the four provinces with coastal lines, namely the Eastern Cape, Western Cape, 
Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). I consider the role of the unaffected 
provinces in respect of holding public hearings and developing mandates on the bill. 
 
(iv) The final case study, the Protection of State Information Bill [B6B-2010], 
concerns a s 75 bill. It is included here to provide an opportunity to reflect on how 
much time the NCOP devotes to processing bills that do not ‘concern provinces’ 
from a constitutional perspective. This is important in light of the challenges 
presented by the legislative cycle applicable to s 74 and s 76 bills.  
 
                                                 
137 Rules of the National Council of Provinces ibid. 
138 Plenaries attract a wider audience than committee meetings and are often also broadcast on 
television to a much wider audience outside of Parliament. Thus a province’s Declaration of 
Vote in plenary ensures the electorate at large are informed of this view and also contributes to 
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provincial interests’ (M Wittneben ‘The role of the National Council of Provinces within the 
framework of co–operative government in South Africa. A legal analysis with special regard to 






The next sections present the case studies in more detail. 
 
2. The Traditional Courts Bill [B1-2012] (‘TCB’) 
 
The Constitution lists customary law and practice under Part A of Schedule 4 as one 
of the concurrent national and provincial functional areas. Thus national legislation 
concerning it falls under s 76. Currently traditional courts are governed by ss 11 and 
20 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (‘BAA’).139 The TCB was 
introduced in 2012 to provide for legislation on traditional courts as the relevant 
sections of the BAA were, at the time, being kept alive by a ‘sunset clause’ that was 
to expire on 30 December 2012.140 The Chairperson of the Select Committee on 
Security and Constitutional Development introduced the TCB in the NCOP as a s 
76(3)141 bill as the Constitution allows for certain bills to be introduced in the 
NCOP.  
 
The TCB emanated from the Justice Department’s 2008 ‘Policy Framework 
on the Traditional Justice System under the Constitution’142 (‘policy framework’). It 
would regulate traditional courts, give effect to the policy initiatives enunciated in 
the policy framework;143 and give effect to the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003, which ‘enjoin[ed] the Department...to 
                                                 
139 Christa Rautenbach ‘Therapeutic jurisprudence in the customary courts of Sou th Africa: 
(traditional authority courts as therapeutic agents): notes and comments’ (2005) SAJHR 21 (2) 
at 327. 
140 In November 2012 Parliament passed the Repeal of the Black Administration Act and 
Amendment of Certain Laws Amendment Act, 2012 that extended the operation of the BAA 
until such time as legislation on traditional courts is enacted. The amendment Act came into 
operation 28 December 2012. 
141 This includes bills that fall within the functional areas listed in Schedule 4 or that provide 
for legislation that requires provincial mandates, the participation of local government, 
recognises the powers of the Public Protector to investigate matters involving the state in any 
sphere of government; and legislation that promote the principles and policy relating to public 
administration, the Public Service Commission and the public service.  
142 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Policy Framework on the 
Traditional Justice System under the Constitution’ available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/tradcourts/2008_tradcourts_pfrmw.pdf , accessed on 16 
September 2015  
143 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Report to the Portfolio Committee 
on Justice and Constitutional Development re: The Traditional Courts Bill, 2008’ 31 August 
2009 available at htttp://www.lrg.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/docs/TCB/2012/DOJ_report_2009.pdf , 





allocate roles and responsibilities to the institution of traditional leadership in the 
administration of justice’.144 But the bill quickly attracted opposition. Women’s 
organisations, including the Alliance for Rural Democracy (‘the Alliance’) 
comprising a number of women’s organisations and academia,145 argued that the bill 
was incompatible with living customary law (which secures women’s rights). They 
also maintained that there had been a lack of, or inadequate, consultation with rural 
women who would be most affected by the bill. Several individuals (including the 
Minister of Women, Children and Persons with Disabilities) and civil society 
organisations called for the TCB’s withdrawal. While no provinces specifically 
called for the bill’s withdrawal, some expressed doubt that it would achieve its 
objectives.146 The Eastern Cape believed the bill was ‘fundamentally flawed and no 
amount of amendments [would] be able to remedy the Bill’.147 The North West 
communities wanted the bill to be ‘done away with’.148 Gauteng found ‘inherent 
challenges’149 with some of the provisions of the bill, while the Eastern Cape 
thought that the bill ‘[did] not create any form of uniformity and [left] the process at 
the discretion of each traditional court to determine the content of the law’.150 
 
Notwithstanding the six week-legislative cycle prescribed in NCOP Rule 240, as 
explained in Chapter 3, a committee may, in terms of NCOP Rule 240(3), request 
the Chairperson of the NCOP for an extension of the time limit to deal with a bill. 
The Select Committee was granted an extension until 30 December 2012. Its delay 
in dealing with negotiating mandates drew much criticism. As the Justice Minister 
showed no intention of withdrawing the bill and the Committee could not withdraw 
the bill without obtaining provincial mandates to that effect, the Committee had to 
                                                 
144 Policy Framework at 40. 
145 The Legal Resources Centre (LRC) represented the Alliance.  
146 The Free State’s negotiating mandate was in favour of the bill and did not refer to the issue 
of consultation or the SALRC bill and recommendations. The mandate did, however, raise 
issues relating to equality and constitutionality in dealing with individual clauses.  
147 Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature (2012) Traditional Courts Bill [B1–2012] Negotiating 
Mandate 23 May 2012 at 1. 
148 North West Provincial Legislature (2012) Traditional Courts Bill [B1–2012] Negotiating 
Mandate 16 and 18 May 2012. The province, however, submitted a new mandate in 2013 in 
support of the bill. 
149 Gauteng Provincial Legislature (2012) Traditional Courts Bill [B1–2012] Negotiating 
Mandate 18 May 2012 at 3. 
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continue processing the bill. Section 65(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that at 
least five provinces must vote in favour of a question to be decided in the NCOP. 
Provinces submitted their written negotiating mandates prior to the negotiating 
meeting. Four provinces had rejected the bill in their negotiating mandates, one 
province (Mpumalanga) requested an extension in order to hold public 
consultations, while the remaining four supported the bill but proposed 
amendments. This meant that a negotiating mandate meeting was required. 
Thereafter provinces were expected to submit final mandates that either 
unequivocally rejected or supported the bill.  
 
2.1 Public participation on the TCB 
 
According to s 118 of the Constitution, provincial legislatures must consult the 
public in respect of bills affecting provinces. The outcome of such public 
participation is intended to inform the content of mandates conferred on provincial 
delegations. Gauteng had consulted with local government and included the views 
of the Gauteng Department of Local Government and Housing in its negotiating 
mandate.151 Organisations like the Land Access Movement of South Africa, the 
Legal Resources Centre and the Law, Race and Gender Unit of the University of 
Cape Town made presentations or submissions in more than one province, as well 
as to the NCOP. Non-governmental and women’s organisations thus maximised 
their input and influence on the negotiating mandates conferred by provincial 
legislatures.  
 
The provincial legislatures’ public consultations notwithstanding, criticism 
against the department’s lack of public consultation continued to surface. It is 
important that a department also hold public consultations. Legislation is based on 
policy. Policy-making, according to s 85 of the Constitution, is the prerogative of 
the executive authority which is vested in the President152 and which he exercises 
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together with other members of the Cabinet.153 This includes ‘developing and 
implementing national policy’154 and ‘preparing and initiating legislation’.155 In 
South Africa most legislation is introduced by the executive. According to s 195 of 
the Constitution the ‘[b]asic values and principles governing public administration’ 
includes that (a) ‘[p]eople’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be 
encouraged to participate in policy-making’156 and (b) ‘[t]ransparency must be 
fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate 
information’.157 Section 195(2) makes it clear that these principles apply to all 
spheres of government and organs of state, while s 195(3) requires national 
legislation to ‘ensure the promotion of the values and principles listed in subsection 
(1)’. It is therefore important for a department to consult the electorate before 
introducing a bill in Parliament, lest it end up being rejected. Apart from ensuring 
that more people are made aware of policies and legislation, the emphasis or 
‘function’ of the executive’s public consultation is to test whether its policies 
reflected in proposed legislation is acceptable to the electorate. If not, it means the 
department must go back to the drawing board before introducing such a bill in 
Parliament.  
 
In the case of the TCB, the department admitted on 24 October 2012 that its 
consultation on the bill had been inadequate. This raises another question: whether 
the public participation processes of a provincial legislature and/or the NCOP can 
correct a department’s flawed or inadequate consultation process, or whether the 
NCOP is obliged to prevent such a bill from being passed. There is possibly no legal 
answer to this. The CC has confirmed that due to the separation of powers it cannot 
dictate to Parliament how to deal with its constitutional obligations in dealing with 
bills, including how it conducts public consultations required by s 59 and s 72(1).158 
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Parliament can send bills back to departments for more consultation, if necessary. 
Departments are free to consult as they see fit, provided consultation is adequate and 
complies with the values and principles listed in s 195 of the Constitution. Further, 
once Cabinet has approved a bill, provinces are unlikely to reject it or send it back 
— whether for political or technical reasons. Because of the governing party’s 
majority in the provincial legislatures, ANC delegates in the NCOP and provincial 
legislatures will understandably be reluctant to oppose legislation developed at 
national level in the light of party discipline expected from ANC members dealing 
with a bill. This is not peculiar to the ANC or to South Africa — the same would 
apply to most, if not all, governing parties in other democracies. For example, a 
study of party discipline in Germany between 1990 and 2000 (after the unification 
of East and West Germany) found that politicians from both sides voted according 
to ‘pro-party norms’ and that this ‘party voting agreement in [länd] parliaments 
cause[d] substantive policy outcomes to vary across the [länder] according to the 
partisanship of the legislative majority rather than along east-west lines, even on 
issues where MPs’ values differ[ed] greatly in east and west’.159 
 
Secondly, on the technical aspects of a bill — provinces are reluctant to send 
legislation back to the executive, even where provinces or the public raised concerns 
that the department failed to deal with certain aspects in the bill or that its public 
consultation had been flawed and required considerable revisions to the bill. The 
NCOP and provinces’ stance on the TCB illustrates this. To remedy the 
department’s flawed public participation on the TCB meant that the bill would have 
needed extensive amendments, tantamount to rewriting the bill. For the NCOP to fix 
the bill the NCOP and provinces would have had to extend their own public 
consultations quite considerably. The tight legislative cycle applicable to s 76 bills 
and the relative rigidity of the mandating process, however, made extending public 
participation very unlikely. 
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2.2 Government’s consultation on the bill  
 
The Department did not consult the people who would be most affected by the bill, 
in particular women in rural areas. Apart from a national Conference of Magistrates 
that the department hosted in 2007 and that was attended by more than 500 
delegates (including members of the judiciary, judicial officers and ministers), the 
department held seven consultative workshops with the national and provincial 
houses of traditional leaders in 2007 and 2009. It also consulted the South African 
Local Government Association, the South African Human Rights Commission, the 
Commission on Gender Equality, magistrates and prosecutors.160 Considering that 
South Africa had 14.5 million people living under traditional authorities according 
to the 2011 Census,161 the Department’s consultation was clearly inadequate. Not 
only did it not consult the majority of the people living under customary law that 
were directly affected by the bill, but its consultation focused on those who would 
administer or adjudicate the bill — the traditional leaders and the judiciary. 
 
The adverse reaction to the TCB showed that when consultation is lacking or 
inadequate the result is a flawed and unacceptable bill. The TCB contents showed a 
glaring ignorance of, or disregard for, the way living customary law was practiced in 
traditional communities, and flouted constitutional principles like the separation of 
powers and the right to a fair trial. 
 
Provinces criticised the department for singling out traditional leaders as the 
key stakeholder to consult on the bill. The ‘lack of consultation at the conceptual 
stage of the Bill [had] been raised at most of the public hearings held by the Eastern 
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Cape Legislature’.162 The Free State would have preferred translations of the bill in 
‘official languages accessible to traditional communities’.163 The Western Cape’s 
consultation had been ‘impeded by the fact that the Bill was only issued in 
English...a language that is not understood by the majority of people who would be 
affected by the Bill’. Communities were unaware that the bill had also been printed 
in isiXhosa.164 In addition, ‘the process of consultation did not allow communities 
the opportunity to substantially engage with the provisions and possible implications 
of the Bill’.165  
 
The department had hoped that the NCOP would widen consultations on the bill. 
However, the NCOP and provinces’ lack of capacity (including financial capacity) 
and constrained time-frames ruled out extended public consultations. The 
Constitution expects both the executive and the legislature to conduct public 
consultations. It would set an undesirable precedent if departments were to pass on 
their public consultation responsibilities by ‘riding’ on the NCOP processes that 
must necessarily follow the introduction of s 76 bills. At the most, the NCOP’s 
public consultation processes are meant to augment the department’s consultation 
processes. The principle of co-operative governance and co-operation between the 
different spheres of government obliges the national department to consult/co-
operate with the provincial governments. It could have given effect to this principle 
by bringing provincial departments on board which could in turn have involved 
local government structures to conduct grass roots consultation with eg rural 
women. This would have built on the basis of multi-level government aimed at 
deepening democracy and bringing government closer to the people, in addition to 
being responsive to the needs of the people according to s 195(e) of the 
Constitution.  
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2.3 NCOP’s role in widening public participation  
 
Some provinces had complained about the limited time they had to conduct public 
consultations. In recognition of this and the criticism over the department’s 
inadequate public consultation on the bill, the Select Committee decided to hold its 
own public hearings on the TCB. This was despite the fact that provinces had 
already begun to submit negotiating mandates. The Select Committee believed that s 
72(1) of the Constitution which states that the NCOP must ‘(a) facilitate public 
involvement in the legislative and other processes of the Council and its 
committees’, was wide enough to allow for this.166 Public hearings were held at 
Parliament in Cape Town between 18 and 21 September 2012. The Report on the 
public hearings and submissions was sent to provinces in order for them to consider 
the new information gathered. Provinces could thus amend their mandates or submit 
fresh ones as the NCOP had not yet considered them. Nevertheless, some provinces 
like the Eastern Cape chose not to amend or submit new negotiating mandates. It is 
not clear to what extent other provinces considered the input from the NCOP’s 
public hearings as the negotiating mandates did not specifically refer to the NCOP 
public consultation. Possibly, no ‘new’ information came out of this process as the 
same organisations who called for the TCB’s withdrawal and those who made 
submissions to the NCOP also made similar submissions in the different provinces 
during the provincial public consultations.  
 
The Select Committee next discussed the bill in 2013. As provinces’ 
negotiating mandates still showed no clear direction on the fate of the bill, the 
Acting Chairperson announced that the Committee would not deal with mandates. 
He requested provinces to hold additional public hearings and to clarify ambiguous 
mandates. The Alliance saw this development as ‘[s]talling debate on provincial 
mandates’ which, it concluded, had been a ‘default response’ of the Select 
Committee for almost two years. The Alliance felt that the motivation behind the 
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request was to ‘consult until [the public] change[d] its mind’.167 Additional public 
hearings were planned, for example, in the North West where 95 per cent of the 
2050 people that had attended public hearings had rejected the bill.168  
 
Procedurally speaking, a provincial committee can reconsider and amend its 
mandate without further public consultations. Nevertheless, provinces agreed to the 
request as some welcomed more consultation on the bill. The North West, Free State 
and Mpumalanga held additional public hearings. The Western Cape, Gauteng and 
Eastern Cape felt their public consultations had been adequate and did not amend 
their mandates. KZN’s amended mandate opted to abstain from negotiations, in 
other words it would not participate or vote in the negotiating meeting. The North 
West changed its mandate to vote in favour of the bill.169 This was a wide departure 
from the previous mandate in which the ‘community at large’ called for the bill to 
be ‘done away with’.170 Mpumalanga too changed its mandate to support the bill 
after additional public consultations. These U-turns on the TCB strengthened the 
perception that additional public hearings were intended to change provinces’ minds 
on the bill.  
 
Limited as the NCOP and provincial consultations were, they had reached more 
communities than the department. Despite the negative perceptions about its request 
that provinces hold additional public hearings, the NCOP had contributed to 
deepening democracy, and widened and increased public participation on the TCB. 
Nevertheless, consultation with a few thousand people in nine provinces on a matter 
that affects the daily life of many South Africans in diverse communities, remains 
grossly inadequate.171 For the most part, the negotiating mandates tended to reflect 
the views of those consulted — this was particularly clear in the initial negotiating 
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mandates that rejected the bill and the reasons for that. Some provinces like 
Mpumalanga and the North West changed their mandates to support the bill after 
holding additional public hearings. While these provinces complied with the 
technical requirement to hold public consultations in order to develop their new 
negotiating mandates, it shows that the mandating process can be politically 
manipulated to achieve a desired outcome — the electorate can be persuaded to 
accept a bill that they previously rejected, in other words ‘consult’ until people 
change their minds. If provinces that rejected the bill stuck to their positions the 
TCB could not be passed. In this way the mandates, combined with a requirement of 
public hearings, can provide a democratic brake on autocratic action by the rejection 
of unacceptable legislation. As it were, through the otherwise democratic process of 
additional public consultations, provinces who ended up supporting the TCB 
inadvertently legitimised autocratic action. However, if done properly and with the 
right motivations, the diverse outcomes of discussions held in nine different 
provinces on the same bill cannot be predicted or easily manipulated, and thus 
legislation will not reflect the national view only. This is what Valli Moosa had in 
mind — that the promotion of provincial interests during the mandating process is to 
ensure that the debate takes place in the provinces at all times.  
 
2.4 Voting stalemate  
 
As discussed under voting mandates in the previous Chapter, s 65(1)(b) of the 
Constitution stipulates that all questions (except s 75 bills in respect of which 
delegates vote as individuals, and constitutional amendments bills in terms of s 74 
which require an affirmative vote of six provinces to be passed) before the Council 
are agreed to when at least five provinces out of nine vote in favour of the question. 
Questions include ss 76 and 74 bills before the Council. The Select Committee 
interpreted the application of s 65 in respect of the TCB to mean that it needed the 
supporting vote of five provinces to be passed. This incorrect interpretation of 
voting requirements (possibly motivated by party interests) led to unnecessary 
delays and agonising over the TCB and made the mandating process unnecessarily 





2014 (before the Council’s first plenary in 2014) was presented with a stalemate — 
negotiating mandates indicated that four provinces rejected the bill, four were in 
favour of the bill with proposed amendments; and one (KZN) abstained. Because of 
the opposition to the bill, the Select Committee incorrectly expected five provinces 
to reject the bill in their mandates. This brought unnecessary rigidity to the 
mandating process. Provinces attempted to vote on proposed amendments, but 
despite a quorum of seven provinces, the meeting could not achieve a majority of 
five provinces to vote in favour of proposed amendments.  
 
Although the question whether to accept or reject the TCB outright was not directly 
put, a rejection of proposed amendments by those provinces who made this a 
condition for approving the bill meant they essentially rejected the bill. Due to the 
mechanical way in which provincial negotiating mandates were dealt with, the 
negotiating meeting could not resolve the stalemate. Logically, one would have 
assumed that because the TCB did not get the required support from provinces, it 
could not be passed. Because of the stalemate, and in the absence of five provinces 
supporting the bill according to the Select Committee’s expectation, the only other 
option left was to allow the bill to lapse. No further meetings were held on the TCB 
after 11 February 2014, leaving the matter unresolved as the bill lapsed soon 
thereafter.172  
 
2.5 Concluding remarks on the TCB 
 
The mandating procedures followed in the TCB elicited robust discussion in the 
legislatures and in the public domain. Because of provinces’ interest in this bill, the 
NCOP and provinces’ public consultation were carefully scrutinised and the delays 
in dealing with provincial mandates (what the public perceived as delaying tactics) 
came under heavy criticism due to inadequate public consultation and wide-spread 
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opposition to the bill. Four provinces (three of them ANC-governed) rejected the 
TCB, while four others wanted extensive amendments before they would accept the 
bill. The Alliance noted that it was unusual for ANC-governed provinces that 
rejected the TCB to break rank in this manner. This is a positive sign for provincial 
participation in the legislative process. South Africa’s ‘constitutional democracy’ 
includes the principles of ‘a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness’ — commitment to these principles 
‘shows that our constitutional democracy is not only representative but also contains 
participatory elements’.173 Furthermore, the multiple levels of government are 
required to co-operate rather than compete with each other. Ideally national 
government should consult provinces in order to get their buy-in on national 
legislation they must implement.174 It is therefore encouraging that, given the 
opportunity, provinces can boldly raise their concerns, indicate whether or not 
proposed legislation is acceptable to them, and specify how national government 
can make offending provisions more acceptable to provinces.  
 
The NCOP’s processing of the bill also casts the spotlight on the conduct of 
the permanent delegates in the Select Committee, especially the ANC delegates, 
who did not want to break rank. Had the Select Committee dealt with the initial 
mandates purely on the basis of those received, the result would have been a 
rejected bill. Thetja Mofokeng, the Chairperson of the Select Committee on Security 
and Constitutional Development, was interviewed in connection with this study in 
2013. He reflects on the tension between what provinces may want, what the party 
wants and the tension caused by being a member of a political party on the one 
hand, and being a member of a parliamentary committee tasked with processing 
legislation that does not enjoy the support of everyone: 
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[T]he Executive, most of them are party leaders and in some instances, 
whatever the provinces may feel, the final word would be what the party 
wants....There is delay in finalising [the TCB] because [even] in the provinces 
[where] the ANC is the majority...there is no consensus... the mandates we have 
received, they are conflicting and some are in conflict with the policy of the 
organisation. So, in most cases we are expected to pass the laws that are 
consistent with the Constitution, but at the same time reflect the party policy.175 
 
Possibly stakeholders (including the Justice Minister and ANC delegates) 
could have tried to reach consensus beforehand on the best way to deal with the bill 
in Parliament. Members of Parliament are under strict party discipline and the 
centralised control of the ANC means that it is hard (and rare) for provinces to step 
out of line. The manner in which the Select Committee dealt with the TCB confirms 
observations by Murray et al that permanent delegates in the NCOP were often out 
of touch with provinces, forgot that they represented provinces in s 76 bills, and 
acted as party representatives instead.176 The Committee erred in its desire to ensure 
that the outcome of the bill would be laid at provinces’ door — provinces had to 
indicate whether or not they rejected the bill or wanted the bill withdrawn, as 
opposed to the Committee taking such a decision. In this way ANC members would 
not be at odds with senior party members of the executive responsible for the bill in 
the event that the bill was rejected or withdrawn. ANC domination also showed in 
the extent to which party interests came into play during the processing of the bill. 
Because governing parties run the risk of losing support in future elections should 
they pass legislation that the electorate opposes, an early indication from the public 
that legislation is unacceptable allows them to remedy the situation — either 
withdraw the bill or amend the bill in line with public opinion. The long time it took 
before the TCB eventually lapsed shows that the ANC does not, however, always 
see public opposition to a bill in a positive light. 
 
The implication of the NCOP’s processing of the TCB for the mandating 
process generally, is that the requirement of a mandate in addition to public 
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participation threw a spanner in the departmental works. The hard lesson learnt from 
the processing of the TCB is that the department must do proper consultation in 
provinces with affected groups and levels of government before introducing a bill 
that affects provinces in Parliament. Notwithstanding Mofokeng’s views quoted 
above, the requirements of co-operative governance mean that the national 
department must engage fully with provincial governments and provincial 
legislatures in the policy-making and legislative process as they have a say over 
such matters — they cannot simply be ignored or steamrolled. Ideally these issues 
are settled before a matter gets to Parliament. 
 
The NCOP would otherwise need to bend over backwards to amend a bill that 
emanates from a flawed departmental public consultation process, in addition to 
extending its own public consultation period beyond the already tight legislative 
time-frame. Considering that the NCOP’s and/or the provincial legislatures’ public 
consultation must merely augment the department’s own public consultation 
processes, the legislature should not try to fix such a bill, but rather send it back to 
the department to do proper consultation. The public or provinces cannot be ignored 
and the involvement of provincial legislatures (as opposed to provincial executives 
in the German Bundesrat model) in the legislative process is intended to ensure this. 
Even though this is not often evident because of the ANC’s dominance in the 
legislatures, the TCB case study shows that it does sometimes occur.  
 
3. The Legal Practice Bill [B20D-2012] 
 
The LPB was classified as a s 76 bill because some of its provisions dealt with trade 
and consumer protection, which are two of the functional areas of concurrent 
national and provincial legislative competence listed in Schedule 4 to the 
Constitution. The bill proposed the establishment of the South African Legal 
Practice Council to regulate the affairs of legal practitioners (both advocates and 
attorneys) nationally, as well as Provincial Councils.177 Currently each province has 
                                                 





its own Bar Council and Law Society to regulate advocates and attorneys in that 
province. These are autonomous bodies with their own assets and fiduciary 
responsibilities. The establishment of the Provincial Councils had implications for 
existing provincial bar councils and law societies as they would need to be dissolved 
and their assets disposed of.  
 
The Western Cape was the only province that opposed the bill, regarding it as 
fusion of the attorneys and advocates professions in disguise. The main focus of the 
discussion of the LPB in this chapter, however, concerns the provision in the NCOP 
Rules for the minority view in a committee to be included in its report, and a 
Declaration of Vote in the Council to explain a province’s vote. In this section I also 
briefly consider the reason for the inclusion of minority parties in NCOP 
delegations, and the political dynamics at play when the delegate delivering a 
provincial mandate on a s 76 bill is not a member of the majority party in the 
conferring provincial legislature. 
 
NCOP Rule 102(4) provides that the committee report must reflect the 
minority view. The Committee may not, however, produce a minority report. This 
provision also applies to provinces that hold a different view to other provinces on, 
eg a s 76 bill. During the consideration of final mandates on the LPB, the Western 
Cape delegate read the province’s Declaration of Vote178 into the record and 
requested that the committee report reflect this minority view.179 The Western 
Cape’s Declaration of Vote was also read in the Council prior to the commencement 
of voting in the Council.180 
 
In theory it would be possible for any province to make a Declaration of Vote, 
whether or not it supports a bill and irrespective of its initial indication during the 
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mandating processes in the select committee of how it will vote in the NCOP 
plenary. For example, if a province changed its vote prior to voting in the Council, 
the head of the delegation or his or her nominee, would indicate in a Declaration of 
Vote that the provincial legislature has (a) reconvened, (b) rescinded its original 
mandate and (c) conferred a new binding mandate according to which he or she 
must vote in the Council.  
 
At a national preparatory meeting for the NCOP’s inception held at Parliament 
in September 1996 between the Speaker of the National Assembly (Frene Ginwala), 
the President of the Senate (Kobie Coetsee) and representatives of the nine 
provinces and local government, it was decided that ‘[m]inority parties [would] 
participate fully in the committees of the provincial legislatures and the NCOP, and 
in the process of formulating provincial mandates’.181 NCOP delegations are 
appointed on the basis of proportional representation reflecting the political parties’ 
numerical strength in the respective provincial legislatures. As members of an 
NCOP select committee must have a representative for each province, it is possible 
for a member of a minority party in the NCOP to represent a province in which the 
majority party in the provincial legislature is a different party.  
 
The Mpumalanga negotiating mandate on the LPB was presented by the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) delegate. The DA was the opposition in the Mpumalanga 
legislature and held different views to the province’s view presented in the 
mandate.182 Because the mandating process is essentially intended to garner 
provincial views it leaves little or no scope for any real role for minority views, 
apart from those provided in NCOP Rules 71 and 102(4) discussed earlier. Where 
the opposition holds a different view on a matter, the committee may take this into 
consideration, and may even accommodate such view. However, a committee 
decision technically reflects the vote of the majority of its (predominantly ANC) 
members.  
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Members of the opposition can convey their parties’ views on a s 76 bill when 
the provincial legislature sits in plenary to confer a final or voting mandate on its 
provincial delegation and also during the debate in the NCOP plenary preceding the 
voting on the bill. Because the Western Cape is ruled by the opposition, the 
provincial view is also that of the official opposition in Parliament, the DA. The 
latter often differs from the ANC’s views on bills, hence the Western Cape’s 
Declaration of Vote on the LPB. However, when opposition party members form 
part of provincial delegations, they deliver mandates on behalf of the province and 
not their parties. During mandating procedures this applies to both special and 
permanent delegates, and irrespective of whether the delegate briefs or takes part in 
discussions in the NCOP committee or in the provincial legislature committee on 
the bill. Nothing of course, prevents an opposition party delegate to indicate that the 
view expressed in the mandate itself is different from his or her party’s views and to 
also present the party’s views to the NCOP committee which must take this into 
account.  
 
The LPB case study illustrates that party politics influence mandating processes, 
necessitating a fine balance between individual and party views on the one hand, 
and the provincial view on the other hand. Although delegates represent provinces 
when they deliver a mandate on a s 76 bill, it can become tricky when the delegate 
is from a different party than the majority party in the conferring provincial 
legislature. I mentioned earlier that NCOP Rule 102(4) requires a committee report 
to also reflect the minority view. Thus, although provinces in control of minority 
parties (or minority parties themselves) may not be able to stop the NCOP from 
passing a bill they oppose, the inclusion of the minority view in the committee 
report and the opportunity to make a Declaration of Vote in the NCOP plenary 







4. The National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal 
Management Bill [B40B-2007] (‘the Coastal Management Bill’) 
 
The Coastal Management Bill sought to address the challenges experienced in 
coastal provinces which included erosion, storm damage, flooding and pollution 
which had been caused by, among other things, fragmented and ‘sectoral’ planning 
and decision-making.183  
 
The bill set out the responsibilities of national, provincial and local government in 
managing the coast. Future planning and decision-making would be through 
integrated planning and decision-making by a National Coastal Management 
Committee (NCC) in conjunction with Provincial Coastal Committees (PCCs) and 
Municipal Coastal Committees (MCCs).184 Provincial governments were required to 
inter alia develop provincial environmental implementation plans, monitor 
compliance and intervene when implementation plans were not complied with. The 
Coastal Management Bill (CMB) placed obligations on municipalities to ensure 
access to the coast. It also allowed the Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism to expropriate privately-owned land and re-demarcate it as coastal public 
property. 
 
4.1 Issues affecting provinces raised in mandates 
 
The issue of adequate funding to implement a bill is extremely important as it 
relates to provincial executives’ interests and their ability to fulfil their legislative 
obligations. This was one of the relatively few province-specific issues affecting the 
four coastal provinces that were raised in the negotiating mandates and during 
deliberations on the bill in the NCOP. The small number of issues raised were 
possibly due to the department’s extensive consultations on, and the integrated 
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approach taken in, the bill. The CMB was aligned with both the White Paper on 
Environmental Management Policy for South Africa (‘EP’) of 1998 and the 
Constitution, leaving perhaps little or no room for potential areas of contestation 
arising from issues that could affect provinces. In this model, the NCOP, as a public 
forum in which to raise provincial issues, serves as a kind of stopgap or safety net to 
‘catch’ important provincial concerns that may have been overlooked or ignored. 
For example, KZN raised valid funding concerns regarding the implementation of 
the CMB as it was directly affected by the bill. Surprisingly, these concerns were 
ignored. As a province directly affected by the CMB the KZN’s presence at the 
negotiating meeting in the NCOP was crucial to ensure its concerns were addressed 
and that its delegation push for the adoption of its proposed amendments to the bill. 
Although it sent through a list of proposed amendments, the KZN’s representative 
was inexplicably absent during negotiations to fight for what the province wanted. 
In my view the CMB negotiating meeting should not have proceeded as the quorum 
requirement for bills affecting certain provinces only cannot be met if a directly-
affected province is not represented. Because the other provinces were not as vested 
in the issues the KZN wanted the bill to address, it is perhaps not unsurprising that 
the KZN’s proposed amendments were not adopted during negotiations. It is 
precisely for this reason that provinces directly affected by a bill must ensure their 
representatives attend negotiating mandate meetings — sending a list of proposed 
amendments to the NCOP does not guarantee that the amendments will be 
considered, let alone adopted. The NCOP Rules too could possibly be amended to 
ensure the presence and effective participation of directly-affected provinces in 
negotiations, similar to the higher standard of participation the Constitution requires 
in respect of constitutional amendments that affect the provincial boundaries of 
certain provinces only. 
 
Apart from extending negotiations to ensure issues raised by directly-affected 
provinces are adequately addressed, affected provinces should also proactively 
lobby other provinces’ support for their views or positions on bills affecting them. 
Thus, where there had been inadequate public consultation on a bill or where 
provincial concerns were largely ignored, the NCOP is unable to effectively play its 






4.2 Provinces not directly affected by a s 74 or s 76 bill 
 
The MPPA is silent on the participation of provinces not directly affected by s 74 or 
s 76 bills. In practice such provinces need not conduct public consultation. This must 
be viewed in light of the Constitutional Court’s pronouncement on public 
participation in Doctors for Life v The Speaker of the National Assembly185 that 
‘[t]he obligation to facilitate public involvement was a material part of the law-
making process and was a requirement of manner and form. Failure to comply with 
this obligation rendered the resulting legislation invalid’.186 In Doctors for Life the 
CC was approached to declare invalid four health sector acts187 because the NCOP 
and the provincial legislatures had failed to comply with their constitutional 
obligations to facilitate public involvement in their legislative processes as 
contemplated in s 72(1)(a) and s 118(1)(a) of the Constitution. The CC found no 
evidence, 
 
that the NCOP had held public hearings or invited written representations on 
any of the [b]ills. Insofar as the provincial legislatures were concerned, some 
but not all of the provinces had held hearings in respect of some but not all of 
the [b]ills. Some provincial legislatures had considered written representations 
that had been submitted to the National Assembly but it was not clear...whether 
any of them had invited new or supplementary representations from the 
public.188 
 
While it had been ‘reasonable’ for the NCOP to decide to hold public hearings 
in the provinces, provinces were obliged to hold such hearings and NCOP members 
had to attend or had to be given ‘access to the reports of those proceedings’.189 An 
evaluation of the public participation processes followed in respect of each contested 
bill showed that very few provinces held public hearings. The CC held that, 
consequently, the NCOP’s failure to hold public hearings was unreasonable and that 
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it ‘did not comply with its obligation to facilitate public involvement...as required by 
s 72(1)(a)’.  
 
In the present case study only two of the inland provinces elected to hold 
public hearings on the CMB. If the Doctors for Life decision is followed the NCOP 
would have had to hold public hearings to make up for this shortfall. In Doctors for 
Life the contested legislation affected all provinces, whereas only four coastal 
provinces were directly affected by the CMB. In my view the requirement to hold 
public hearings in affected provinces only is in line with the CC’s decision in 
Matatiele 2190 which concerned the validity of a constitutional amendment that 
affected certain provinces only. In Matatiele 2 the Court held that s 74(8) of the 
Constitution applied191 and that the NCOP could not pass the bill or the relevant 
amendment without the approval of the legislatures of the affected provinces. The 
affected provincial legislatures were thus obliged to facilitate public involvement as 
required by s 118(1)(a) of the Constitution. The CC reiterated the importance of 
public participation which it previously expounded in Doctors for Life as the 
Constitution ‘calls for open and transparent government and requires legislative 
organs to facilitate public participation in the making of laws by all legislative 
organs of the State’ and also ‘requires institutional co-operation and communication 
between national and provincial legislatures’ as institutionalised in the NCOP.192 
 
While voting in the NCOP plenary decides the fate of a bill, the final or voting 
mandate must be informed by views and decisions (including public opinion) prior 
to this. The purpose of public hearings is thus to ensure that the legislature, in 
developing its mandate, also considers public input and does not merely hold public 
hearings to comply with technical constitutional requirements. Regarding the 
development of mandates in respect of the CMB, however, the responsibilities of 
non-affected provinces were not clear. The North West did not submit a negotiation 
or final mandate, and its delegate did not attend the negotiating meeting in the 
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NCOP.193 Gauteng did not receive any written or oral submissions on the bill. It 
supported the bill but did not propose amendments. Limpopo, Free State and 
Mpumalanga submitted both negotiating and final mandates.  
 
Although the quorum of five provinces required by s65(1)(b) of the 
Constitution does not apply to committees, it would seriously hamper negotiations 
(and thus the entire mandating process) if provinces not directly affected by a s 74 
or s 76 bill were absent from negotiating and final mandate meetings and failed to 
participate in any of the mandating processes. The presence of the four provinces 
that were directly affected by the CMB at, and their participation in, these meetings 
were crucial.  
 
As mentioned before, adequate funding to implement a bill relates to provincial 
executives’ interests and their ability to fulfil their legislative obligations. As 
implementation of the CMB would be phased in, provinces were expected to plan 
around the different deliverables and time-frames. KZN had raised some valid 
concerns which should have been given more consideration. This would perhaps 
have prevented the need for the 2013 amendment bill to deal with some of the issues 
that had been raised in 2007. Further negotiating meetings would have allowed KZN 
to insist that more consideration was given to its concerns.  
 
4.3 Concluding remarks on the CMB 
 
The CMB is a good example of a bill that was properly consulted from the 
conception or policy-development phase. It illustrates that proper consultation 
ensures a relatively smooth mandating process. The processing of the CMB, 
however, also raised questions concerning the role of provinces not directly affected 
by a bill and the mandating procedures governing their participation. In addition, it 
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considers what proactive steps directly-affected provinces can take to ensure their 
concerns and/or views are given proper consideration in the NCOP. In the CMB 
case study, KZN’s concerns about funding to implement the bill were ignored. 
There is, however, no indication that KZN employed other means to advance its 
concerns besides the formal mandating processes, eg by lobbying other provinces’ 
support. In addition, KZN should have ensured that its representative was present 
during negotiations to fight for all its proposals to be included. If necessary, the 
province could have asked for the negotiating meeting to be postponed. In order for 
negotiations to succeed all provincial negotiators must be present. The KZN’s 
proposals were not included in the 2007 bill because it was absent from the 
negotiations in the NCOP, whereas other provinces were there to protect their own 
interests. At the time of the CMB’s processing the NCOP was still a relatively 
young institution. Even seasoned NCOP and provincial delegates did not fully grasp 
the technical aspects of the mandating procedures and the need for provinces to be 
proactive and ensure they have their own strategies in place to advance their own 
provincial interests and not expect the NCOP alone to do this — the NCOP merely 
provides a forum or platform in which provinces can have frank discussions around 
issues that affect them and come to an agreement about the best way to address 
those issues. The NCOP can then be used effectively as an institution to enforce or 
mediate agreements that provinces conclude among themselves. 
 
5. Protection of State Information Bill [B6B-2010] 
 
During the term of the Fourth Parliament from June 2009 to March 2014,194 s 75 
bills continued to form the bulk of legislation the NCOP processed. How much time 
and effort should the NCOP devote to bills that do not concern provinces? This is 
important in light of the challenges presented by the six-week legislative cycle 
applicable to bills that affect provinces directly.  
 
                                                 
194 Parliament’s Bills Office statistics show that Parliament passed 48 bills in 2013 of which 10 





The processing of the Protection of State Information Bill in the NCOP 
attracted much public attention due to certain controversial provisions in the bill. 
The bill was widely opposed due to the restrictions it would place on the right to 
freedom of speech. It classified certain categories of information as state 
information and proposed severe penalties for those found in possession of 
classified information. This held severe implications for journalists in particular. 
They would not be able to publish classified state information in the public interest 
and rely on a ‘public interest defence’, as the bill did not contain one.  
 
The bill was passed by the NA with most of the contentious clauses intact. 
Due to the public interest in the bill, the NCOP House Chairperson was appointed to 
chair the Ad Hoc Committee on the bill. The legislative cycle in the NCOP was 
extended a few times, and the NCOP also held public hearings in all nine provinces 
between 31 January 2012 and March 2012. This was very uncommon for the NCOP 
as it usually only plays a reviewing role in respect of  s 75 bills, considering the 
ability of the NA to override any amendments proposed by the NCOP.  
 
Nevertheless, the extensive and protracted deliberations on the bill, while not 
strictly necessary, allowed the NCOP to amend the bill more extensively than was 
possible in the NA by the time it was passed.195 The NCOP provided the ANC (a) 
with an opportunity to restore public confidence in the organisation and reconsider 
its unwillingness to amend some of the controversial clauses in the bill that had 
elicited widespread public opposition during the NA process; and (b) a second 
chance to address concerns over the bill’s constitutionality. The preoccupation with 
the bill, however, diverted attention away from provincial interests and bills that 
affected provinces directly.196 Other committee meetings (for example the Select 
Committee on Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs which is often 
inundated with s 139 interventions in municipalities) and the NCOP’s overall 
legislative programme took a back seat to the Ad Hoc Committee programme. 
When they attended public hearings, delegates could not meet in other committees 
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on which they served and could not fulfil their responsibilities in respect of other 
legislation before the NCOP. Media attention on the bill briefly cast a spotlight on 
the NCOP and its delegates — some meetings were broadcast, and individual 
delegates and parties were interviewed regarding developments and their views on 
the bill — also unusual for a s 75 bill before the NCOP.  
 
The uneasy relationship between party and provincial politics in the NCOP, as 
well as the ANC’s dominance and discipline over its members on the one hand, and 
the opposition parties’ opposition to the bill on the other hand, were clear during the 
processing of the Protection of State Information Bill. The ruling party wanted the 
bill to be passed and the NCOP was used to sort out some of the controversy that 
had marked its passage through the NA.  
 
Some may argue that the role and effectiveness of the NCOP should be measured 
against the role that it should play in promoting provincial interests and processing 
bills that actually affect provinces. Viewed strictly through the lens of provincial 
interests, the NCOP deserves the criticism over its ‘failure...to assert itself as a 
house that truly serves provincial needs’197 when the Protection of State Information 
Bill was processed in 2012. Possibly, the NCOP should have restricted itself to 
reviewing the bill, given the NA’s power to override NCOP amendments in s 75 
bills.198 Perhaps the NA’s acceptance of the NCOP’s amendments in this bill did not 
justify the energy, time, money and political will expended that should rightfully 
have been invested in processing s 74 and s 76 bills that actually concern provinces.  
Nevertheless, the Constitution gives the NCOP a role in reviewing s 75 bills, thus 
acting as a kind of second safety valve to catch issues not adequately dealt with by 
the first chamber. In the case of the Protection of State Information Bill the NCOP 
was acting as a traditional Westminster-style second chamber — a house of review. 
In reality it went beyond mere review due to the time and effort to conduct country-
wide public hearings and the extensive amendments effected in the NCOP which 
was also unusual. The end result was a bill that was more constitutionally compliant 
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and thus more acceptable to the electorate, as the NCOP was able to get political 
parties to listen to public opinion and each other, and work through their differences 
in order to amend the contentious provisions of the bill. Arguably, the NCOP would 
represent provincial interests much more effectively if it could get provinces to 
come together in the same way, to negotiate and agree on how best to deal with 
contentious s 74 and s 76 bills like the TCB discussed earlier. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The NCOP was designed to give a voice to provinces in the legislative and other 
processes of Parliament. However, the extent to which it gives effect to this 
Constitutional prerogative varies in practice as the case studies illustrate.  
 
The discussion of the TCB shows that the departmental consulting processes 
were clearly inadequate which resulted in a poor bill that faced much resistance. The 
bill eventually lapsed but only after a painfully protracted process in the NCOP. 
This was initially partly because of the tight legislative time-frame which was later 
extended. Other factors that played a role were the relative rigidity of the mandating 
process (especially negotiations) and the interpretation of the voting requirement in 
s 65 of the Constitution. The MPPA does not address these challenges in the 
mandating process — including ensuring adequate and meaningful public 
participation and mechanisms to address an impasse during negotiations to ensure a 
clear outcome — whether an amended, unchanged, or a rejected bill. The impasse 
could have been addressed at a political level: the fact that it was not either points to 
an unwillingness by politicians to make more use of such mechanisms, or a lack of 
sophistication or maturity in current politics. 
 
In contrast, the CMB was widely accepted by the public due to the thorough 
seven-year public consultation process — from the development of the policy to the 
introduction of the bill in Parliament. Nevertheless, the CMB case study also points 
to a need to clarify the roles of provinces not directly affected by s 74 or s 76 bills. 





apply to committees. However, it would make negotiations and the entire mandating 
process more effective if provinces not directly affected by a s 74 or s 76 bill were 
compelled to be present at, and participate in, negotiating and final mandate 
meetings. Such a provision can be inserted in the MPPA and/or in the Rules of the 
NCOP. Compelling full participation by all provinces will allow affected provinces 
to lobby the support of other provinces regarding proposed amendments or support 
for the bill as a whole. This will ensure that voting mandates cast in plenary not only 
comply with s 65 as a mere technicality, but are informed by real consideration and 
understanding of the views of the provinces that are actually affected by the bill.  
 
Departments must consult the electorate before introducing bills in order to 
comply with their own consultation requirements under s 195 of the Constitution. In 
this way the NCOP and provinces’ consultation can augment the departmental 
consultation process. While this might assist in processing bills within the current 
legislative time-frame, the legislative cycle should nevertheless be extended.  
 
The six-week legislative cycle prescribed in the NCOP rules, and not the 
MPPA itself, limits the time available for public consultation. Requesting extensions 
in terms of NCOP Rule 240(3) on s 76 bills is not a feasible solution — a more 
practical and realistic legislative cycle is needed that would enable provinces to 
participate more meaningfully in the legislative and other processes of Parliament.  
 
The Protection of State Information Bill case study shows that the NCOP has 
a role to play in reviewing controversial s 75 bills and can help to release some of 
the tension surrounding such bills. This, however, comes at a cost and will require a 
major commitment of precious time and human and financial resources to eg hold 
extensive public hearings throughout the country.  
 
In instances where the NCOP Rules, the Joint Rules of Parliament199 and the MPPA 
are silent or inadequate to address some of the challenges raised in the case studies, 
                                                 





it would be desirable to review and amend them. However, as I point out earlier, 
some challenges need political solutions which require parties in the NCOP and the 
provincial legislatures to come together with a common goal to discuss challenges 
and develop real solutions. In some instances provinces themselves are to blame for 
not maximising their input on bills before the NCOP. Nothing prevents a province 
from, eg arranging public hearings on bills about which they receive early notice. 
Provinces directly affected by a bill must ensure their representatives are present at 
negotiating mandate meetings — the CMB case study shows that sending a list of 








ALTERATION OF PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES: MANDATING 
PROCESSES FOLLOWED FOR THE CONSTITUTION TWELFTH 
AMENDMENT BILL, 2005, AFFECTING MERAFONG CITY CROSS-




Chapter 3 briefly discusses the MPPA, which provides a uniform mandating 
procedure for provincial participation in the NCOP on issues and bills that affect 
them. Chapter 4 illustrates various challenges in the mandating processes for s 76 
bills through case studies. Chapter 4 also notes instances where the MPPA is either 
silent or fails adequately to address specified challenges. In this Chapter I discuss 
various aspects and challenges in the mandating procedures concerning 
constitutional amendment bills that propose changes to provincial boundaries in 
terms of s 74(3)(b)(ii) of the Constitution. The case study in this chapter is the 
Constitution Twelfth Amendment Bill, 2005 (‘Twelfth Amendment’) which was 
passed by the NCOP prior to the enactment of the MPPA. Its validity was later 
challenged in the Constitutional Court (CC) in Merafong Demarcation Forum & 
Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others (‘Merafong’).200 Of 
interest is how the mandating processes unfolded in the NCOP, and the 
pronouncements of the CC regarding a province’s power to veto a proposed 
provincial boundary change, the public involvement requirement and a provincial 
legislature’s right to change its mandate, and whether constitutional amendment 
bills that alter provincial boundaries can be amended after they are introduced. The 
MPPA does not expressly address these issues. 
 
First, I briefly consider the applicable constitutional and legislative 
framework, and the problematic concept of cross-boundary municipalities which 
                                                 






triggered the Twelfth Amendment. Second, is a brief discussion of the facts of the 
Merafong case and the reasons for the CC challenge to the decision of the Gauteng 
Provincial Legislature (GPL) to support the change to Gauteng’s provincial 
boundary proposed by the Twelfth Amendment. Next, I discuss how the CC dealt 
with the questions whether the GPL’s decision to support the Twelfth Amendment 
had been rational and whether it had complied with the public involvement 
requirement in terms of s 118 of the Constitution. Last, I discuss Van der 
Westhuizen J’s conclusion in Merafong that a constitutional amendment bill altering 
provincial boundaries cannot be amended and explain why I disagree with this view.  
 
I argue that the Constitution and the applicable rules of Parliament did not explicitly 
rule out the amendment of constitutional amendment bills altering provincial 
boundaries and that an interpretation of the relevant provisions should have 
favoured the enhancement of provinces’ participation by allowing them to amend 
such constitutional amendment bills in the NCOP. Further, the CC’s decisions in 
Mazibuko201 and Oriani-Ambrosini202 (mentioned in earlier chapters), also support 
the notion that the Rules of Parliament must give effect to the constitutional right of 
provinces to participate (through the NCOP) in amending the Constitution, 
especially constitutional amendment bills that affect provinces.   
 
2. Constitutional and legal framework governing constitutional 
amendments 
 
Section 74 of the Constitution states that only certain constitutional amendments 
require the assent of the NCOP. It must be involved when amendments relate to (a) 
the Preamble or s 74(1) of the Constitution, (b) Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) and (c) a 
matter that (i) affects the Council (NCOP), (ii) alters provincial boundaries, powers, 
functions or institutions, or (iii) amends a provision that deals specifically with a 







provincial matter. These constitutional amendments can be passed only if a majority 
of six provinces vote in favour of them in the NCOP.203  
 
Section 74(8) provides that if a bill ‘referred to in subsection (3)(b), or any 
part of the Bill, concerns only a specific province or provinces, the [NCOP] may not 
pass the Bill or the relevant part unless it has been approved by the legislature or 
legislatures of the province or provinces concerned’. Provinces must therefore 
participate fully in the processing of such constitutional amendment bills. Section 
70(2)(b) of the Constitution provides that the NCOP ‘must provide for...the 
participation of [all the provinces] in its proceedings in a manner consistent with 
democracy’ (my emphasis). This does not mean all provinces, but at the very least 
directly-affected provinces, must participate fully. Furthermore, participation in the 
context of constitutional amendment bills does not mean the processing of the 
amendment, but rather whether the provincial legislatures of the affected provinces 
agree to the provincial boundary change and by implication to the proposed 
constitutional amendment. This provision goes to the heart of the NCOP’s mandate 
to represent the interests of provinces.  
 
The Twelfth Amendment was a constitutional amendment bill to which s 
74(8) of the Constitution applied as it proposed changes to the provincial boundaries 
of Gauteng and the North West. It was introduced to give effect to the resolution to 
eliminate cross-boundary municipalities that fell within two provinces, by redrawing 
the provincial boundaries of the affected provinces. In terms of s 74(8) the NCOP 
could only pass the bill or proposed provincial boundary changes with the approval 
of the legislatures of Gauteng and the North West. 
 
As the Twelfth Amendment was introduced in Parliament prior to the 
adoption of the MPPA, the provincial legislatures applied their own Standing Rules 
and prevailing practices to develop and convey their mandates to the NCOP. This 
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did not impact the form or validity of mandates per se. If the provincial legislature 
did not approve the constitutional amendment, such amendment would be invalid. 
The mandate was merely an instrument to convey the provincial legislature’s 
decision to the NCOP. The report of the committee that dealt with the bill in the 
provincial legislature contained details of the public participation that informed the 
provincial legislature’s decision. This indicated that the public participation in the 
affected provinces complied with s 118 of the Constitution as set out in Matatiele 
2.204  
The general practice in respect of constitutional amendment bills altering 
provincial boundaries in terms of s 74(8) is for the affected provincial legislature to 
adopt a resolution to (a) either support or reject the proposed boundary change and 
(b) support or reject the entire bill or that part of the bill that does not affect the
province’s boundary. This ensures adherence to s 74(8) of the Constitution. The
mandate reflects the decision taken by the provincial legislature and instructs the
head of the provincial delegation to the NCOP how to vote on the bill in the NCOP.
However, as was done by the GPL, the provincial legislature’s decision can also be
conveyed to the NCOP in a letter from the provincial legislature’s Speaker referring
to, or accompanied by, a report of the meeting at which the provincial legislature
approved the amendment. The report distinguishes it from ‘ordinary mandates’ and
relates specifically to the provincial legislature’s decision required in terms s 74(8)
of the Constitution.
The MPPA does not deal with constitutional amendments in terms of the 
legislative procedures specifically. The emphasis in the MPPA is about the format 
of the mandate and what information must appear on it. In terms of s 1(b) of the 
MPPA, legislative mandates are required for constitutional amendments and these 
mandates must contain certain specified information. Section 7 of the MPPA 
requires both negotiating and final mandates for bills referred to in s 74(1)(b), 
(2)(b), (3)(b) and (8) of the Constitution. As I mentioned earlier, the provisions of 
the MPPA do not address some of the challenges that emerged during the mandating 
204 Supra. 
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processes in the NCOP concerning the Twelfth Amendment. I discuss these in more 
detail later in this chapter. 
When NCOP approval is not required in terms of s 74(3)(b), because ‘the 
amendment does not concern sections 1 and Chapter 2 and does not relate to a 
matter that affects the council, province or provincial boundaries, powers, functions 
or institutions’, the NA’s report on the amendment is submitted to the NCOP in 
order for it to hold a public debate. However, the Constitution does not require the 
NCOP to vote on the report or the bill.205  
3. Merafong City Cross-Boundary Local Municipality (‘Merafong City’)
The Twelfth Amendment was introduced in 2005 to give effect to a 2002 resolution 
of the President’s Coordinating Council to dissolve cross-boundary municipalities 
and review provincial boundaries. Cross-boundary municipalities had been 
established even though the Constitution was silent on this. A constitutional 
amendment, the Constitution Third Amendment Act of 1998 (‘Third Amendment’), 
was consequently enacted to expressly allow for the establishment of cross-
boundary municipalities.206  
In hindsight cross-boundary municipalities were ill-conceived. Not 
surprisingly, by 2002, the concept of cross-boundary municipalities proved to be 
unworkable.207 Many cross-boundary municipalities experienced ‘numerous 
problems’208 in their administrations because of the extra complication of having 
two provinces involved in the affairs of the same municipality (something not 
foreseen by the drafters of the Act nor the political principals who approved the 
establishment of cross-boundary municipalities). The only options were to change 
205 S 74(5)(c). 
206 The Third Amendment came into force on 30 October 1998. 
207 J Sindane ‘Intergovernmental relations: a provincial perspective — Mpumalanga Province’ 
(2003) dplg Research Bulletin Department of Provincial and Local Government at 12. 
208 ‘Memorandum on the Objects of the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Bill’ Constitution 





municipal demarcations or change provincial boundaries so that municipalities did 
not extend over provincial boundaries. In terms of s 74(8) of the Constitution, the 
latter option would require a constitutional amendment. The Twelfth Amendment 
was proposed to do this (ie amend provincial boundaries so that no municipalities 
spanned two provinces), and in addition, repeal those sections of the Constitution 
referring to cross-boundary municipalities.209 But, as noted above, the NCOP could 
only pass a proposed provincial boundary change with the approval of affected 
provinces (in this instance Gauteng and the North West), effectively giving them a 
veto power.  
 
By 2005 there were sixteen cross-boundary municipalities, including 
Merafong City.210 In terms of the Twelfth Amendment211 the boundary between 
Gauteng and the North West would be redrawn so that Gauteng no longer included a 
part of the municipality of Merafong — thus Merafong would be incorporated 
entirely into the North West and excluded from Gauteng.212 
 
The veto power of a province in a constitutional amendment bill is not 
‘pervasive and all-powerful’213 so as to affect the whole bill, but merely extends to 
those provisions that affect a province directly. The GPL’s negotiating mandate214 
did not support the proposed boundary change as Merafong City residents wanted 
the municipality to form part of Gauteng.215 Thus, if it vetoed the proposed 
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provisions,216 the boundary between Gauteng and the North West would remain 
unchanged. The largest part of Merafong City already fell within Gauteng, while the 
smaller southern part fell within the North West. The GPL proposed an amendment 
to Schedule 1A of the Twelfth Amendment to include Merafong totally within 
Gauteng. Essentially the GPL rejected that section of the Twelfth Amendment that 
affected Gauteng’s provincial boundary and proposed that it be amended to reflect 
an alternative boundary change. However, the GPL did not reject the rest of the bill.  
The GPL was informed in the NCOP that it could not propose amendments to 
a constitutional amendment bill. As a result it presented a final mandate in support 
of the whole bill, including the contentious boundary change that it had initially 
opposed.217 The GPL voted in favour of the bill and the provincial boundary change 
in the NCOP. This decision, however, was taken without reverting to the Merafong 
community that had opposed the bill.218  
The Twelfth Amendment was consequently passed unanimously by the NCOP. The 
Merafong Demarcation Forum thereafter questioned the GPL’s support of the 
Twelfth Amendment and challenged the validity of its enactment in the CC. The 
Court had to consider (a)(i) whether and (ii) when a legislature can change its 
mandate and (b) whether the GPL had a duty to inform the Merafong community 
about its changed mandate and the reasons.  
216 Merafong at para 180. 
217 The final voting mandate in which the GPL decided to support the Twelfth Amendment and 
the proposed boundary change was debated and adopted by the GPL on 6 December 2005, and 
a letter to that effect was submitted to the Chairperson of the NCOP on the same  date. See 
Merafong para 38. 
218 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Minutes Security and Constitutional Affairs Select 
Committee 12 December 2005 Constitution Twelfth Amendment Bill: Final Mandates; 
Suspension of Magistrates’ available at http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20051211-constitution-
twelfth-amendment-bill-final-mandates-suspension-magistrates. Accessed on 16 September 
2015. 
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4. Validity of the enactment of the Twelfth Amendment
The Merafong case was brought on two grounds, namely (i) that by failing to revert 
to the Merafong community before adopting its final mandate, the GPL did not 
comply with its constitutional obligation to facilitate public involvement in its 
processes leading up to the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment in the NCOP; and 
(ii) the GPL did not exercise its legislative powers rationally when it voted in
support of the relevant parts of the bill, thus rendering the Twelfth Amendment and
the Repeal of Cross Boundary Municipalities Law and Related Matters Act,
unconstitutional and therefore invalid.
4.1 Public involvement 
In Doctors for Life, the CC held that for a provincial legislature to discharge its duty 
to consult under s 118 of the Constitution, its decision about the nature of the 
consultation must be reasonable and rational. An important element in Merafong 
concerns the role and substance of this duty and the degree to which the NCOP 
represents provincial, compared to party political, interests.  
Merafong residents considered themselves more part of Gauteng than the 
North West. They perceived services to be better in Gauteng, especially in relation 
to water and sanitation and the expanded public works programme. The vast 
majority were opposed to the proposal to incorporate Merafong City entirely into 
the North West. They also felt that there were no substantive and compelling 
reasons for the proposed re-demarcation. The GPL had developed its negotiating 
mandate in line with the community’s rejection of Merafong City’s proposed 
incorporation into North West. According to Sachs J its failure to go back to the 
people of Merafong to explain its change of position violated the constitutional 
goals associated with participatory democracy, including (a) conditions necessary to 
pass laws that are widely accepted and effective in practice, (b) strengthening the 
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legitimacy of legislation in the eyes of the people, and (c) acting as a ‘counterweight 
to secret lobbying and influence-peddling’.219  
The Court agreed that public consultation must be meaningful and not mere 
lip service or a public relations (‘PR’) exercise. It evaluated the requirement in s 118 
of the Constitution that the legislature must facilitate public involvement, by asking 
‘whether the legislature had done what was reasonable in the circumstances’. It 
concluded that although unreasonable, ‘the failure of the [GPL] to report back to the 
Merafong community when the Gauteng delegates realised that they were unable to 
fulfil their mandate and amend the bill in the NCOP did not rise to the level of 
unreasonableness that would result in the invalidity of the Twelfth Amendment 
(which was otherwise properly passed by Parliament)’.220  
Sachs J dissented. He believed that more intense consultation was required due to 
the unique nature of the legislation in respect of which the province could veto those 
provisions that altered its provincial boundaries.221 The reasons provided by the 
GPL for its change of heart were not communicated to the people of Merafong. In 
Sachs J’s view the GPL, due to its ‘arms-length democracy’, had fallen short of 
completing its constitutional duty to facilitate public involvement, despite the initial 
public input that had informed its negotiating mandate.222  
4.2 Was the GPL’s decision rational? 
The rationality standard requires that the exercise of public power must not be 
arbitrary or based on ‘naked preferences’ — there must be a link ‘between the 
means adopted by the legislature and the end sought to be achieved’.223 The 
legislature only needed to show that its conduct had a justifiable ‘rationally 
219 Sachs J at para 292. 
220 Van der Westhuizen J at paras 55–56. 
221 Para 295. 
222 Para 301. 
223 Van der Westhuizen J at para 62. 
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objective basis’ which served a ‘legitimate public purpose’.224 The GPL decided to 
change its final mandate to vote in support of the boundary change in the Twelfth 
Amendment after it was informed that (a) the province’s negotiating mandate could 
not propose amendments to the constitutional amendment bill and (b) the province 
had to indicate (i) whether it voted in favour of or rejected (vetoed) those provisions 
in the bill that affected Gauteng province only and (ii) whether or not it approved 
the rest of the bill.  
NCOP Rule 219(i) provides that a select committee ‘may...present an 
amendment [b]ill’.225 The legal advice given in the NCOP, however, was that: 
[T]he NCOP’s power to amend extended to every part of the [b]ill except the
part where only the provincial legislatures had the right to say ‘no’. Provincial
legislatures were voting on only the parts that effected their specific boundary
or border [—] legislatures did not have the power to amend but only a veto
power....The NCOP was not allowed to propose amendments since there might 
be conflicting amendments [and] there was no way...to determine which 
amendment was more valid. In order to diffuse this conflict, while still not 
taking away autonomy from the provinces, the provisions said that the province 
had the right to decline a particular process relating to that province. If the 
province wanted to bring changes afterwards another constitutional amendment 
would have to be proposed at a later stage to try and incorporate those 
concerns.226 
The GPL consequently concluded that it could only vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the 
proposed boundary change. It decided to support the proposed boundary change 
and the rest of the bill, possibly persuaded by the views that it would defeat the 
objective to abolish cross-boundary municipalities and delay the upcoming 2006 
local government elections if the bill was not passed; and that not supporting the 
boundary change and the rest of the bill would leave a constitutional vacuum if 
consequently the bill was not passed by the NCOP. Under these circumstances the 
decision to change the mandate appeared rational, albeit based on a 
misinterpretation of the relevant constitutional and legislative provisions. 
224 Van der Westhuizen J at para 63. 
225 Rules of the National Council of Provinces ibid . 
226 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Minutes Security and Constitutional Affairs Select 
Committee 30 November 2005 Constitution Twelfth Amendment Bill: Negotiating Mandates’  
op cit note 214. 
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Moseneke DCJ227 in a dissenting judgement thought that the GPL’s change of 
heart had been ‘swayed’ by a ‘belated consideration of the implications of not 
supporting the bill’ and a misunderstanding of its powers under the Constitution 
regarding voting and mandating processes. Its decision,  
was not taken to pursue a legitimate governmental purpose but to prevent 
consequences which, at best, were imaginary. [The] legislative conduct of the 
provincial legislature in the exercise of its power and duty under s 74(8) of the 
Constitution [was thus] irrational and inconsistent with the Constitution.228 
In Moseneke DCJ’s view, the GPL’s decision to approve the Twelfth 
Amendment was invalid and its consequent adoption of the Cross-Boundary 
Municipality Laws Repeal and Related Matters Act was inconsistent with the 
Constitution to that extent. 
Van der Westhuizen J for the majority (in my view, correctly) found that the extent 
of the GPL’s irrationality did not render the Acts invalid because the legislature did 
not exercise its powers irrationally in arriving at its decision. The decision was only 
taken after it had debated the issue and once the relevant committee had explained 
its change of position. As the GPL’s support of the bill in the NCOP was not 
irrational, the Court dismissed the application to declare the Acts invalid. 
5. Can a provincial legislature change its mandate without reverting to the
community?
The CC considered whether a provincial legislature can change its mandate without 
reverting to the community it previously consulted. Did it have a duty to inform the 
affected community why it changed its mandate? As the Rules of Parliament allow a 
province to change its vote right up to voting in the NCOP plenary, one can accept 
that a mandate can be changed. Of concern is the community’s interest and 
227 Merafong at para 191. 
228 Supra. 
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influence in the contents of a mandate. Whose decision is it anyway — the 
provincial legislature or the electorate who inform the legislature’s mandate on how 
it must vote? Van der Westhuizen J concludes that there is ‘no authority for the 
proposition that the views expressed by the public are binding on the legislature if 
they are in direct conflict with the policies of the Government’.229 The policy in this 
instance was the Government’s objective to abolish cross-boundary municipalities. 
Merafong City refused to be relocated, but the public opinion on the bill 
notwithstanding, the GPL was within its right to change its mandate as long as there 
was a rational explanation. I agree that the public opinion informs, but cannot 
dictate, the provincial voting mandate in respect of a bill. 
6. Can a constitutional amendment bill altering a provincial boundary be
amended?
The GPL’s decision to support the Twelfth Amendment in the NCOP was triggered 
by the view given in the NCOP that a constitutional amendment bill altering a 
provincial boundary cannot be amended. In my argument below I set out why I 
disagree with this view. I argue that the Constitution does not explicitly rule out 
amendment of such bills, and that the Court in Merafong failed to take into account 
that Parliament’s Joint Rules230 and NCOP Rules specifically provide for provincial 
delegations to propose amendments to s 74 bills in the NCOP. In terms of NCOP 
Rule 219(i) the NCOP committee dealing with the bill ‘may...present an amendment 
[b]ill’. Therefore, the mandating procedure in the NCOP which is designed to
enhance provincial participation in the legislative process, should allow enough time
for consideration and decision-making in the NCOP of affected provinces’ proposed
amendments to constitutional amendment bills in general, and of constitutional
amendment bills altering provincial boundaries in particular. As such, the
interpretation and implementation of the relevant provisions should favour the
enhancement of provinces’ participation, including in amending constitutional
amendment bills altering provincial boundaries.







The GPL’s proposed amendments to the Twelfth Amendment bill were not 
accepted in the NCOP on the grounds that the Constitution and the Rules of 
Parliament did not allow for the amendment of such constitutional amendment bills.  
 
In Merafong, Van der Westhuizen J briefly considers the question whether 
constitutional amendment bills altering provincial boundaries can be amended. In 
his view, the GPL had been correctly advised that it could not propose an 
amendment to the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Bill as:  
 
[Section] 74 does not provide for substantive amendments in the NCOP and for 
referral back to the National Assembly to consider those amendments. 
Although the NCOP fulfils an important function in the protection of provincial 
interests, there is no scope for debate and for substantive amendments as far as 
bills altering provincial boundaries are concerned. The reason is of course the 
mandated nature of the process. Delegates to the NCOP vote on the basis of 
provincial mandates. They cannot agree to support an amendment which they 
have not been mandated by their provincial legislatures to support.231 
 
I disagree with Van der Westhuizen J’s conclusion as his reasons strengthen, 
rather than invalidate, an interpretation that allows for constitutional amendment 
bills altering provincial boundaries to be amended. Viewed in the light of the text of 
the Constitution, and NCOP Rule 219(i), it is clear that provision is made in both the 
NCOP and Joint Rules for provinces’ participation in amending constitutional 
amendment bills. Van der Westhuizen J incorrectly fuses the issue of amending 
constitutional amendment bills with that of provincial approval of provincial 
boundary changes. He also ignores the significance of, and the requirements 
governing, the different mandating phases in the NCOP. Provincial approval 
conveyed in the mandate before the NCOP is not necessarily final. Because a 
provincial legislature can change its mandate right up to the time it will vote on the 
bill in the Council — any changes in the mandate can be conveyed to the NCOP by 
the head of the delegation that will cast the province’s vote in the Council. The 
                                                 
231 Para 81. 
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NCOP thus needs evidence that the provincial legislature approved the boundary 
change, irrespective of the wording of the mandate.  
I turn now to briefly look at the text of s 74 and the approach of the CC when 
interpreting constitutional provisions. 
The text of the Constitution and the intention of the legislature 
Prior to the existence of the NCOP, the Senate was the second chamber of 
Parliament that had to protect provincial interests. Section 61 of the IC232 provided 
that bills,  
affecting the boundaries or the exercise or performance of the powers and the 
functions of the provinces shall be deemed not to be passed unless passed 
separately by both Houses and, in the case of a [b]ill, other than a bill 
[amending the constitution] affecting the boundaries or the exercise or 
performance of the powers or functions of a particular province or provinces 
only, unless also approved by a majority of the province or provinces in 
question in the Senate.233 
Although the veto in s 74 of the final Constitution compared with IC 61 shows 
a ‘diminution in the power which is enjoyed by an individual province or provinces’ 
in the new text (NT), this is to be weighed against the context of the provision in NT 
41(1) which provided ‘constitutional protection against national legislation or 
executive conduct which discriminates against a particular province or 
provinces’.234  
232 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.  
233 Section 62(1) of the IC provided that in order for bills amending the Constitution to be 
passed, it had to be adopted at a joint sitting of the National Assembly and the Senate by a 
majority of at least two thirds of the total number of members of both Houses. In addition, s 
62(2) required that constitutional amendment bills that amended the ‘boundaries and 
legislative and executive competences of a province’ could not be amended ‘without the 
consent of a relevant provincial legislature’. 
234 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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According to Kate O’ Regan, the text of the South African Constitution 
matters ‘both because of its ‘provenance and...its content’ as it is the ‘product of full 
and careful negotiation’.235 It is also important to note that the constitutional 
principles contained in the IC against which the NT had to be evaluated were ‘flags 
that indicate[d] the political tensions of the time; perhaps...most notable in relation 
to the question of provincial powers’.236 In her view:  
The task of interpretation is...to ensure that the structures and relationships 
created by the Constitution work as a coherent whole...and any particular text 
must contribute to this whole [and] acknowledge that South Africa’s history 
and circumstances provide important context in construing specific provisions. 
The concern with context, however, deliberately seeks to eschew consideration 
of political controversy.237 
Section 68 of the Constitution, which deals with the powers of the NCOP 
under Chapter 4 of the Constitution, states that ‘[i]n exercising its legislative power, 
the [NCOP] may (a) consider, pass, amend, propose amendments to or reject any 
legislation before the Council, in accordance with this Chapter’ which includes bills 
amending the Constitution.  
When considering the Court’s decision against the role and the powers the 
Constitution assigns to the NCOP in the legislative processes of Parliament, 
including its participation in amending the Constitution, I agree with Bishop that ‘the 
Court was wrong to conclude that provincial delegations cannot propose 
amendments to section 74 bills in the NCOP’.238 Bishop argues that the reasons 
provided by Van der Westhuizen J namely, that ‘(a) section 74, unlike sections 75 
and 76, does not mention amendments; (b) the NCOP procedure is a mandated one; 
and (c) rule 174(3) provides a special procedure for section 74(8) bills’ are all 
‘technically correct’, but ‘wrong’ because ‘each of the three rationales leaves a great 
235 Kate O’ Regan ‘Text Matters. Some reflections on the forging of a new constitutional 
jurisprudence in South Africa’ (2012)  75(1) MLR at 10.  
236 O’ Regan op cit note 235 at 12. 
237 O’ Regan ibid at 15. 
238 Michael Bishop ‘Vampire or Prince? The Listening Constitution and Merafong 
Demarcation Forum & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others’ (2009) 2 
Constitutional Court Review at 345. 
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deal out’. First, while it is true that the Constitution is silent on amending s 74 bills 
altering provincial boundaries, ‘it does not explicitly prohibit them’. Bishop 
questions whether there is ‘any underlying principle supporting [the Court’s] 
reading’239 that the Constitution’s silence on the issue means that it prohibits the 
amendment of constitutional amendment bills. In his view, such an interpretation:  
[D]oes not serve to enhance any form of democracy. The inability to propose
amendments severely restricts the ability of delegations to the NCOP to listen to
each other. A delegation may be aware of the concerns of other provinces, but if
it cannot respond by supporting a change to the legislation that they are
considering, the scope of the Constitution and the legislative process (and any
subsequent court proceedings) to accommodate those concerns all but
disappears. The only option is the unattractive one of rejecting a bill altogether.
This prospect is uninviting when most legislation contains a large range of
uncontested provisions, or when the legislation has, for good reason, been fast-
tracked.240
Secondly, the CC’s argument that the mandated nature of the NCOP 
procedure supports the conclusion that amendments of constitutional bills altering 
provincial boundaries are prohibited is not clearly explained and seems to be 
concerned with the time factor in the legislative cycle. Van der Westhuizen J notes 
that the GPL’s negotiating mandate was never considered by a full sitting of the 
legislature. This was, however, the standard practice regarding negotiating mandates 
which, in the GPL, were conferred by its Portfolio Committee acting on behalf of 
the provincial legislature. In terms of the applicable Standing Rules of the GPL, the 
Portfolio Committee had the requisite authority to confer a negotiating mandate on 
its representative in the NCOP on behalf of the GPL. Contrary to viewing the 
mandating procedures in the NCOP as an impediment or restriction on a province’s 
ability to propose amendments to a constitutional amendment bill, the mandating 
process is designed to enhance provincial participation in the legislative process — 
it is precisely because of the mandated nature of the NCOP that proposing 
amendments to a constitutional amendment bill altering provincial boundaries 
should be possible. Of importance was that authority for the final voting mandate, in 
239 Bishop op cit note 238 at 346. 





which the GPL decided to support the Twelfth Amendment and the proposed 
provincial boundary change, was properly conferred.241 
 
Section 65(1) of the Constitution ‘makes a mandated vote the default 
mechanism for all decisions in the NCOP’,242 except for s 75 bills that do not affect 
the provinces. According to Bishop the Constitution: 
 
[E]xplicitly contemplates the possibility of amendment within that mandated 
structure for other bills, and the Joint Rules explain how that occurs. Is there 
any reason why amendment would be practical for other bills, but not 
constitutional amendments? Absolutely none. If anything, amendments to our 
basic law require greater deliberation, participation and more effective 
representation than ordinary legislation. Those goods are exactly what 
prohibition of amendment denies.243 
 
He concludes that the Constitution ‘leaves it up to the various legislative 
bodies — the NA, the NCOP and the various provincial legislatures — to decide 
how to deal with amendments to section 74 bills’.244 However, in Merafong the 
Court failed to take into account that the Joint Rules245 and NCOP Rules make 
specific provision for provincial delegations to propose amendments to s 74 bills in 
the NCOP, what Bishop regards as ‘the most glaring omission in the Court’s 
reasoning’. NCOP Rule 219(i) 246 provides that a select committee ‘may...present an 
amendment [b]ill’ in respect of a s 74 amendment bill referred to it (interestingly, 
neither the CC in Merafong nor Bishop refer to this rule). In terms of NCOP Rule 
224(1)(a)247 a member may place amendments to a s 74 bill on the Order Paper after 
the bill has been placed on the Order Paper (ie scheduled for plenary in the 
Council), but before the Council makes a decision on the bill. NCOP Rules 224, 225 
and 228 further expound which amendments can be made, how they must be made, 
and the procedure to follow after amendment. Parliament’s Joint Rules 176 to 179 
set out the same procedure; and here Bishop observes that ‘referral to a mediation 
                                                 
241 Merafong at para 38. 
242 Bishop ibid at 346. 
243 At 346. 
244 At 346. 
245 175(b) to 180. 
246 Rules of the National Council of Provinces 9 ed (2008) ibid. 
247 Ibid.  
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committee [is] virtually identical to the procedure followed for any other bill’. The 
Standing Rules of the GPL do not directly deal with the issue of proposing 
constitutional amendments but also do not appear to prohibit the GPL from 
mandating its delegation to propose such an amendment.
In Merafong, the Court concludes that amending s 74(8) bills differs from 
amending other s 74 bills. Bishop does not find any support for the suggestion that 
there is a difference between s 74(8) bills and other s 74 bills; or that Joint Rule 
174(3) deals exclusively with s 74(8) bills so that the other rules mentioned above 
do not apply to s 74(8). In his opinion (a) the CC’s reasoning applies to all s 74 bills 
and there is nothing in the rules that suggest that s 74(8) bills can be amended by 
veto only while other s 74 bills can be amended in the normal manner, and (b) there 
is no ‘principled reason’ to treat the two sections differently. 248  Further, Rule 
174(3) is ‘not at all concerned with the power to propose amendments but with the 
consequences of exercising the [s] 74(8) veto without amendment. Amendments for 
all [s] 74 bills are covered by the detailed procedure in the subsequent rules’.249  
Bishop is of the view that, while it is true that it is likely that amendments to s 74 
bills in the NCOP will be proposed, only in extremely rare cases, ‘Merafong 
suggests that the Court does not understand the vital role the ability to react 
meaningfully to the opinions of others — to listen — must play in any participatory 
or deliberative process’.250 
7. Conclusion
The NCOP cannot pass s 74 amendments without the approval of the provincial 
legislature or legislatures of the affected province or provinces. The NCOP’s 
mandate to ensure provincial interests are taken into account in the legislative 
processes of Parliament must be examined, as Merafong illustrates, against the 
248 At 347. 
249 Ibid. 
250 At 347. 
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requirements of public involvement. These must not be mere ‘PR exercises’, but 
meaningful and continuous in order to apprise citizens of developments that might 
require them to reconsider their mandates, a rational link between the legislation and 
objectives the executive wants to achieve. 
While the majority of the CC held that the legislature is not bound by the 
mandate previously given if the decision to change its mandate is rational, I prefer 
the judgement by Sachs J that a failure to revert to the affected community will 
render such a mandate constitutionally invalid as it does not comply with the 
requirement of meaningful public consultation — Merafong residents were not 
given the chance to say how they feel about the GPL’s change of mandate prior to it 
being changed and after it was changed. 
Should ss 74(3) and (8) of the Constitution allow for amendments in the 
NCOP of a constitutional amendment bill that alter provincial boundaries or any 
other matter that concerns provinces in terms of s 74(3)(b)? This may require further 
refinement and clarification in legislation and the rules of Parliament. The NCOP 
rules in particular must give effect to the constitutional requirement that provinces 
must be involved in the legislative processes of Parliament. In 2013 the CC held in 
Mazibuko v Sisulu and Another, 251 with reference to its majority judgement in 
Oriani-Ambrosini v Sisulu, Speaker of the National Assembly,252 that although the 
rules of Parliament may prescribe a procedure for an envisaged process set out in 
the Constitution, they cannot ‘thwart or frustrate the steps and thereby negate a 
constitutional entitlement’.253 The NA rules were consequently amended to give 
effect to this judgment. Although both cases concerned the NA rules and the rights 
of NA Members, I would argue that the same principle applies to the NCOP. The 
NCOP’s processes and rules relating to constitutional amendment bills must give 
effect to a province’s constitutional right to participate fully in their processing, and 
not render such right ineffective. The NCOP rules or its practices cannot expressly 
251 (CCT 115/12) [2013] ZACC 28; 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC); 2013 (11) BCLR 1297 (CC) (27 
August 2013). 
252 [2012] ZACC 27; 2012 (6) SA 588 (CC); 2013 (1) BCLR 14 (CC).  
253 Para 60.  
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or by omission exclude a province from proposing amendments to constitutional 
amendment bills altering provincial boundaries. If the rules and processes do not 
facilitate provinces’ effective involvement in amending such constitutional 
amendment bills, then they must be amended.  
The mandating procedures leading up to the adoption of the Twelfth 
Amendment took place prior to the MPPA coming into force. It is, however, 
unlikely that the Court would have come to a different conclusion on this matter had 
this Act been applicable to the Twelfth Amendment also. Why allow for negotiating 
mandates and a negotiating meeting if amendments by provinces will not be 
considered? What would delegates then be ‘negotiating’ about? The reasons 
provided by the Court and the state law advisor during the NCOP’s negotiating 
meeting are not convincing. It does not make sense to give a province a veto right to 
reject a proposal affecting it directly, whereas an amendment (possibly requiring the 
executive to compromise if possible), would be less severe. Considering that the 
province directly affected by the proposed amendment can veto that provision 
anyway, it would not require other provinces to consider its proposed 
amendment(s). This weakens the argument that other provinces would not have had 
sufficient notice of the affected province’s proposed amendment(s) to obtain 
mandates in respect of such amendment(s).  
In addition to its veto power, an affected province also has the ‘power to cause 
the severance of the part of the [constitutional amendment] that affect[s] its 
boundaries’.254 Strictly speaking this is an amendment that is referred to the NA for 
action. Where an affected province vetoes a proposed change to its boundary, the 
NCOP is in fact saying that it passes the constitutional amendment bill minus the 
contentious clause:  
[T]he part related to the boundaries of that province must be severed from the
[b]ill and lapses. The rest of the [b]ill may be proceeded with. However, the
severance requires an amendment...and the [b]ill must be referred back to the
254 Van der Westhuizen J at para 102. 
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National Assembly for that amendment to be made. The amendment referred to 
here is the formal amendment that is required for the severance.255 
The above situation applies not only to provincial boundary changes. All 
constitutional amendments referred to in s 74(3)(b) that affect provinces would 
invoke s 74(8). The purpose of s 74(8) is to prevent the majority in the NCOP 
passing legislation that could damage one or more provinces.  
The NCOP’s power to amend constitutional amendment bills in terms of NCOP 
Rule 219(i) applies generally to all s 74 bills (my emphasis) — there is no 
justification to exclude such power from bills altering provincial boundaries. 
Nevertheless, it could help to (a) expressly spell out in the MPPA, NCOP Rules and 
the Joint Rules of Parliament that constitutional amendment bills altering provincial 
boundaries, contain questions affecting the Council or change the functions or 
powers of provinces in the Rules of Parliament and in the MPPA can be amended 
and (b) amend the Rules of Parliament and the MPPA to make it a requirement that 
constitutional amendment bills dealing with the issues covered under s 74(3)(b) 
cannot deal with any other issues except ‘subordinate matter[s] incidental to’ a 
provincial boundary change.256 This would simplify the process considerably. In this 
way, if a province rejects the proposal, it rejects the whole bill. Should it propose an 
amendment, then the financial, fiscal and other implications must be discussed with 
relevant stakeholders and departments — the onus must be on the department to 
show why the proposed constitutional amendment cannot be accepted. The 
amendments must then be referred to the NA for consideration and if they are 
rejected by the NA, the bill must be sent for mediation.  
255 Van der Westhuizen J at para 80. 





South Africa’s current second chamber, the NCOP, bears no resemblance to its 
forerunners. It is unlike both the Westminster-type Senate that existed under the 
Union that represented the elite, and the inflated Senate of the 1950s that represented 
the white minority and was complicit in upholding racially unjust laws until 1980 
when it was abolished. The Senate was revived in 1993 under the IC. It had a 
mandate to represent provinces, but did so poorly.  
In 1994, South Africa became a democracy with a government system 
containing both unitary and federal elements due to the establishment of nine semi-
autonomous provinces and a central national government. The Senate was due for a 
complete overhaul. The drafters of the final Constitution were inspired by the 
German model with its division of power between the federation or national sphere 
of government and the länder (autonomous regions or states comparable with South 
Africa’s semi-autonomous provinces) in which they co-operate and hold each other 
accountable without encroaching on each other’s autonomy. Länder are represented 
in the Bundesrat, the second chamber of the Federal Republic of Germany. Because 
most powers are concurrent in Germany the länder participate directly in the federal 
government through the Bundesrat in the passage of federal legislation they must 
implement. The German model was adapted to suit South Africa’s unique needs and 
thus the NCOP differs from the Bundesrat in significant ways, foremost being that 
the NCOP members are politicians drawn from the provincial legislatures compared 





The optimism Bulelani Ngcuka257 expressed at the NCOP’s launch in 1997 
that it would succeed in representing provinces effectively in the national Parliament 
was accompanied by a realisation that this would be no easy task, given the 
prevailing circumstances and unique challenges in each province. An examination of 
provincial participation258 in the NCOP, almost two decades on, reveals a number of 
interesting findings in how the NCOP gives effect to its Constitutional mandate to 
represent provincial interests in the national legislative processes of Parliament, and 
how effectively provinces themselves participate in these processes, particularly on 
bills and issues that affect provinces directly.  
 
The NCOP has more influence over bills that affect provinces directly, ie s 76 
bills and constitutional amendment bills under s 74, compared to ordinary s 75 bills 
that do not affect provinces. The mechanism through which provinces participate in 
the processing of such bills and decisions is the mandating system. Whereas 
mandating procedures existed under the IC and in the 1996 Constitution, the MPPA 
itself was enacted fairly recently, in 2008. The MPPA provides ‘a uniform procedure 
in terms of which provincial legislatures confer authority on their delegations to cast 
votes on their behalf’ as required by s 65(2) of the Constitution. 
 
The study’s examination of mandating procedures before and after the 
MPPA’s enactment shows that in some respects the MPPA is either silent on certain 
issues/challenges (summarised below) or fail to address them adequately. In other 
instances the Constitution and the NCOP Rules do not provide guidance on how to 
deal with challenges that arise in practice. Some challenges and practices concerning 
eg the revival of s 76 bills emerged because of a misinterpretation of applicable 
provisions in the MPPA and the Constitution, influenced by the tight legislative 
time-frame of six weeks applicable to bills affecting provinces.  
 
                                                 
257 Ibid. 
258 In this context public participation refers to the process of obtain public opinion to info rm 
the provincial legislature’s position on a bill.  
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Provincial participation is at the heart of the mandating process and the negotiations 
phase is when provinces have the ideal opportunity to articulate their unique 
challenges and negotiate with one another on how the contents of bills should be 
amended to address their unique needs, or influence the outcome of a decision on 
other matters that affect them that require the approval of provinces in the NCOP 
plenary. Negotiations, if used optimally, can be a very powerful tool for provinces to 
sway opinions and decisions in their favour (in addition to voting in the NCOP 
plenary).  
2. Challenges
The study shows that the MPPA has not addressed the inherent challenges of the 
mandating process, including ensuring adequate and meaningful public participation 
and mechanisms to end a deadlock during negotiations. Below I list selected 
challenges discussed in the preceding chapters about mandating processes in 
particular and provincial participation in general.  
2.1 MPPA-related challenges 
(a) Ambiguous distinction between mandate types
Chapter 3 notes a certain amount of ambiguity in the MPPA’s definitions of, and 
unnecessary distinctions between, different types of mandates. The differences 
between mandate types are unclear and unnecessary. In addition, there is no 
substantive difference between mandates required for voting on bills and questions, 
as the latter include bills and both types instruct the provincial delegation how to 
vote in the NCOP plenary.  
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(b) The MPPA is silent on how to end a deadlock during negotiations
The TCB case study illustrates the MPPA’s silence on how to deal with a deadlock 
during negotiations and there is no decisive vote to either accept or reject a bill. The 
absence of guidelines to clarify (i) how the negotiating process must unfold; (ii) 
whether or not provinces that oppose a bill may refuse to propose amendments and 
may abstain from negotiations and (iii) whether or not five provinces are required to 
vote in favour of a proposed amendment during negotiations, have contributed to the 
rigidity in the negotiating process and consequently restricted provinces’ potential to 
influence negotiations to their advantage. Ironically, the fact that the MPPA does 
not dictate the entire negotiating process has contributed to the rigidity in the 
process and uncertainty regarding the approach to be followed in instances where 
more than one province propose amendments on the same clause but with different 
wording and/or emphasis. As an unintended consequence, the rigidity can force 
delegates to reject the proposals of another province even though their own 
provinces did not make any proposals on the same matter.  
(c) The MPPA is silent on the participation of provinces not directly affected by s
74 or s 76 bills
In practice provinces not directly affected by s 74 or s 76 bills need not conduct 
public consultation. It would, however, seriously hamper negotiations and the 
mandating process if such provinces do not (i) attend negotiating and final mandate 
meetings and (ii) participate in any of the mandating processes, including the 
constitutional requirement to consult the public in the processing of bills. The 
Coastal Management Bill (CMB) case study illustrates that while the presence at, 
and participation in, negotiations of the four provinces directly affected by the CMB 
were crucial, the participation of unaffected provinces were equally important as 
they had the power to influence the decisions on the bill by eg supporting a specific 
provision to address a specific issue or an amendment to the bill proposed by an 
affected province.  
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(d) The MPPA is silent on the lapsing of ‘extended’ bills
The MPPA does not specify whether a s 76 bill, the processing of which was 
extended beyond the six-week legislative time-frame in terms of NCOP Rule 240, is 
exempted from lapsing if it is not passed at the end of an annual session, and the 
Council does not revive it at the first sitting in the ensuing session.  
(e) The MPPA is silent regarding a decision to revive a bill
A question concerning the revival of bills is not included in the MPPA’s list of 
questions in terms of s 65 of the Constitution that requires provinces to vote on all 
decisions. This omission has contributed to the NCOP’s current incorrect practice in 
terms of which individual delegates (and not provincial delegations) vote on a 
question concerning the revival of bills affecting provinces.  
(f) The MPPA does not expressly address issues about (i) a province’s power to
veto a proposed provincial boundary change, (ii) the public involvement
requirement, (iii) a provincial legislature’s right to change its mandate and
(iv) whether constitutional amendment bills altering provincial boundaries can
be amended in the NCOP.
The MPPA has not addressed the said challenges that the Constitutional Court had 
to consider in Merafong when it had to decide the validity of the Twelfth 
Amendment in 2005. It is, however, debateable whether the MPPA should address 
the above issues or whether it is best left to be addressed in the NCOP Rules and the 
Joint Rules of Parliament. Getting the NA to agree to such a provision in the MPPA 
and the Joint Rules of Parliament might not be too difficult, considering that NCOP 
Rule 219(i) already allows for the amendment of s 74 bills. Because negotiating 
mandates and negotiating meetings are required in respect of constitutional 
amendment bills, provinces directly affected by proposed provincial boundary 
changes should be allowed to propose amendments — this is better than the 
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alternative to reject and therefore veto that provision in the bill (albeit not the entire 
bill).  
The above challenges are exacerbated by certain practices in the NCOP, including 
the manner in which relevant provisions in the NCOP Rules and the Constitution are 
interpreted by the NCOP and provinces alike, as listed below. 
2.2 Provincial participation challenges 
Provinces have yet to fully appreciate the potential of, and engage in, negotiations. 
The negotiating meeting is arguably the most neglected phase in the mandating 
process because provinces that are directly affected by a bill (a) do not always send 
their delegations to negotiating meetings and (b) are not proactive in lobbying other 
provinces’ support (i) over their concerns about eg unfunded mandates in the 
implementation of bills or (ii) for proposed amendments to bills (illustrated in the 
CMB case study). 
2.3 Incorrect application / interpretation of the Constitution and applicable 
NCOP Rules 
(a) The voting requirement for a majority of five or six provinces to vote in favour
of a bill in order to be passed by the NCOP (ito s 65 of the Constitution) was
incorrectly applied in the context of a negotiating meeting on the TCB.
(b) There are no clear guidelines in the Rules or the Constitution concerning the
role in the mandating process of provinces not directly affected by a bill,
whether or not they must conduct public consultations, develop negotiating
mandates and participate in negotiations.
(c) The practical implication of the six-week legislative period prescribed in
NCOP Rule 240 means that only one negotiating meeting is possible which
severely impacts on provinces’ ability to have meaningful discussions about,
and reach agreement on, bills and issues that require their approval.
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(d) The NCOP Rules do not clearly define when the six-week legislative period
applicable to the processing of s 76 bills can be extended by the Chairperson of
the NCOP in terms of NCOP Rule 240, when this extension should end, and
when the situation should be re-evaluated. Coupled with this is the MPPA’s
silence on whether such a bill is exempted from lapsing if it is not passed at the
end of an annual session, and the Council does not revive it at the first sitting
in the ensuing session. With controversial bills like the TCB in which public
consultation was inadequate and which some provinces rejected, the lack of
clarity on whether the bill lapsed or was still required to be processed
contributed to the bill languishing before the NCOP Select Committee for two
years.
(e) In terms of current practice, constitutional amendment bills altering provincial
boundaries cannot be amended in the NCOP although the applicable
constitutional provisions do not explicitly prohibit this and NCOP Rule 219(i)
allows for the amendment of all s 74 bills.
2.4 NCOP delegates’ performance in the political context 
The desire of NCOP delegates to conform to party-political views on, and 
expectations about, the outcome of controversial bills can sometimes result in a rigid 
or stalled negotiations process. The TCB case study illustrates some of the tension 
delegates experience in this regard. 
3. Recommendations
Addressing the above challenges and enhancing the participation of provinces in the 
legislative and other processes in the NCOP, especially in mandating procedures, 
will require (a) amendment of formal NCOP rules and legislation, (b) changes to 
certain current practices and (c) political solutions / interventions by parties in the 
NCOP and the provincial legislatures to first, acknowledge that challenges exist and 






(a) Legislative period 
 
Currently NCOP Rule 240(1) provides that ss76, 74(1), (2) and (3) bills ‘should be 
dealt with in a manner that will ensure provinces have sufficient time to consider the 
bill and confer mandates’. According to NCOP Rule 240(2) ‘[d]epending on the 
substance of the [b]ill, the period may not exceed six weeks’. 
 
An amendment of NCOP Rule 240 should, however, not be prescriptive and should 
allow for an extended period to process a bill if eg the bill is complex, there is a lot 
of public interest in the bill, and/or provinces request more time to process the bill 
and conduct public consultations, viz: 
 
(i) Extend the legislative time-frame in NCOP Rule 240 in consultation with 
provinces and the NA to a period long enough to allow provinces to consult 
properly and develop mandates, and also allow enough time in the NCOP and 
the NA to process the bill without creating bottlenecks. One option is for 
provinces to agree to the adoption of the proposal in the NA’s Second Term 
Programme (dated 14 May 2015) for an eight-week legislative cycle for bills 
affecting provinces.259  
(ii) Amend the current wording of NCOP Rule 240(1) and insert a reference to 
public consultation, eg ‘All section 76, 74(1), (2) and (3) bills should be dealt 
with in a manner that will ensure provinces have sufficient time to conduct 
public consultations, consider the bill and confer mandates’. 
(iii) Amend NCOP Rule 240(2) as follows: ‘Depending on the substance of the bill, 
the period may not exceed eight weeks’. 
(iv) Insert a new sub-rule NCOP 240(3) to provide exceptions to the eight-week 
legislative period, eg: ‘The eight-week legislative period may be extended by 
                                                 
259 On 17 October 2015 this proposal has not yet become effective.  
119 
the Select Committee dealing with the bill based on any of the following 
considerations, if (i) the subject matter of the bill is complex, (ii) the bill is of 
significant public interest, (iii) a province or provinces request more time to 
conduct public consultations, (iv) provinces are unable to conclude 
negotiations and require additional negotiating meetings and /or (v) it is in the 
public interest to extend the legislative period’. 
(v) Invoke Item 3 under Chapter 1 of the NCOP Rules that provides that ‘[t]he
Council may by resolution dispense with or suspend a provision of these Rules
for a specific period or purpose’. This provision is most often used in practice
when it is necessary to fast-track a bill. However, it can also be applied to the
legislative period in respect of bills affecting provinces if eg more time is
needed to consult the public on or process a bill.
(vi) Parliament should seek an agreement with the Leader of government business
or Cabinet on the (i) maximum number of and (ii) dates by which ss 76 and 74
bills must be introduced in Parliament per term or year.
(b) Amendment of constitutional amendment bills altering provincial
boundaries
(i) Expressly provide in the NCOP Rules, the Joint Rules of Parliament and the
MPPA that the NCOP’s power to amend s 74 bills in terms of NCOP Rule
219(i) also applies to constitutional amendment bills that alter provincial
boundaries and that negotiating mandates can propose amendments to such
bills.
(ii) Amend NCOP Rules 227 and 228, Joint Rules 174, 176, 177, 179 and 180, and
insert a new section in the MPPA to specify that NCOP amendments to s 74
bills that alter provincial boundaries must be referred to the NA for
consideration. If the amendments are rejected by the NA, the bill must be sent
for mediation.  If the Mediation Committee cannot make a decision within a
specified time the bill lapses.
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(iii) Amend the NCOP Rules, the Joint Rules of Parliament and the MPPA to
clarify that constitutional amendment bills that alter provincial boundaries,
contain questions affecting the Council or change the functions or powers of
provinces cannot deal with other issues except ancillary or incidental matters.
This will simplify the mandating and voting process so that if a province
rejects the proposal, it rejects the whole bill.
(c) Provincial participation
(i) Provinces must maximise their input on bills and should proactively arrange
public consultations on bills about which they receive early notice.
(ii) The CMB case study highlights the need to clarify the roles of provinces not
directly affected by s 74 or s 76 bills. Insert a provision in the MPPA and/or
the NCOP Rules to (aa) compel all provinces to attend and participate in
negotiating and final mandate meetings, (bb) allow provinces to lobby each
other’s support provinces for the bill or proposed amendments to the bill, and
(cc) provide a mechanism to end deadlocks during negotiations.
(iii) Provinces directly affected by a bill must ensure that, in addition to a list of
proposed amendments, their representatives are present at the negotiating
mandate meeting.
(iv) Change the current practice in the NCOP to allow provinces to cast votes per
province regarding a question to revive a bill affecting provinces.
(v) Invoke Items 1 and 2 under Chapter 1 of the NCOP Rules for ‘[t]he
Chairperson of the Council [to] give a ruling or make a rule on a matter for
which [the] Rules do not provide’ until the Rules Committee can make a
decision on it.
The requirement of provincial mandates to deliver and give effect to the decisions of 
provincial legislatures (on behalf of provinces) is intended to enhance democracy. 
The Rules of Parliament, NCOP practices and the MPPA must thus enhance 
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provincial participation in the NCOP to ensure it happens ‘in a manner consistent 
with democracy’.260 Mandating procedures, if used optimally, can showcase 
provincial participation at its best. The study provides a glimpse of an effective 
mandating process and provincial participation in the discussion of the CMB that 
was properly consulted and widely accepted, whereas the TCB 2012 was rejected by 
some provinces because consultation on the bill had been inadequate. The study 
reveals certain challenges in the mandating process. They are, however, not 
insurmountable and the recommendations provide some guidance on how they can 
be addressed through proposed changes to the MPPA, the NCOP Rules and the Joint 
Rules of Parliament, and certain NCOP practices. Despite the challenges and 
shortcomings, the NCOP has shown remarkable resilience and has made some 
strides to improve provincial participation in its processes. If implemented the 
recommend changes will greatly improve provinces’ experience in and their ability 
to use mandating procedures to their advantage — and by extension enhance the 
NCOP’s ability to fulfil its mandate to effectively promote provincial interests in the 
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